recognizing that “once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid ... [and] [i]f that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that “once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid ... [and] [i]f that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained”
- concluding that state conviction no longer open to direct or collateral attack may be regarded as conclusively valid, and cannot be challenged through a federal habeas corpus petition, except where petitioner raises a claim of the denial of assistance of counsel as set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)
- explaining that collateral attack on unchallenged convictions is untenable given the primary and “compelling interest” in the finality of convictions when, because of defendant’s choice not to seek review, the “conviction becomes final and the State that secured the conviction obtains a strong interest in preserving the integrity of the judgment”
- holding that “once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because defendant did so unsuccessfully),” the prisoner cannot collaterally attack that prior conviction in a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Breyer,
dissenting.
Because the Commonwealth has failed to argue in this Court that the trial court’s consideration of respondent’s 1986 convictions was harmless, and consequently, the issue has not been briefed, I would not overturn the Court of Appeals’ finding that respondent’s sentence was enhanced based on the purportedly defective 1986 convictions. The Court of Appeals, however, operated under the belief that the Constitution generally requires 28 U. S. C. §2254 (1994 ed., Supp. V) petitioners to be able to attack prior convictions that enhanced their sentences. It did not focus on whether the § 2254 proceeding was “the first and only forum available for review of [respondent’s] prior conviction[s].” Ante, at 406. Accordingly, I would vacate the decision below and remand for consideration of that issue. As respondent has not yet shown that he was denied a forum in which to raise his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, any discussion of a constitutionally based exception is premature.