stating that trial court’s intervention in voir dire proceedings is “[u]sually . . . warranted for purposes of clarification and expedition,” and trial court’s comments during voir dire constitute reversible error only when comments “are reasonably calculated to benefit the State or prejudice the defendant’s rights”
How later courts described this case
- stating that trial court’s intervention in voir dire proceedings is “[u]sually . . . warranted for purposes of clarification and expedition,” and trial court’s comments during voir dire constitute reversible error only when comments “are reasonably calculated to benefit the State or prejudice the defendant’s rights”
- holding, in capital case, that trial court is not statutorily prohibited' from individually questioning prospective jurors on issues “beyond initial questioning regarding points of law”
- "[T]rial judge did not limit appellant's voir dire in proper areas of questioning."
- mere fact that 15 of 77 potential jurors dismissed because they held conclusions as to guilt because of publicity does not in and of itself establish the inability of appellant to be tried by impartial jury
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLINTON, J.,
dissents to disposition of the fourth point of error because appellant's right to effective assistance of counsel was denied in that counsel did not receive adequate notice of when an examination would be conducted.
TEAGUE, J., dissents.