stating that appellate deference to Rule 403 determination “is a rule of judicial restraint, intended . . . to avoid the anomaly of having appellate courts usurp a function that the system assigns to the trial courts” and grants trial judges “considerable freedom in evaluating proffered evidence’s probative value in relation to its prejudicial effect”
How later courts described this case
- stating that appellate deference to Rule 403 determination “is a rule of judicial restraint, intended . . . to avoid the anomaly of having appellate courts usurp a function that the system assigns to the trial courts” and grants trial judges “considerable freedom in evaluating proffered evidence’s probative value in relation to its prejudicial effect”
- holding that trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the probative value outweighed prejudice and admitting evidence that “appellant frequently walked around naked, with an erection, in the presence of his children” in prosecution of the appellant for indecency with a child
- concluding that appellant’s instructions to victims “not to reveal the event to anyone shows a consciousness of wrongdoing which in turn leads to an inference that when he touched the children as he did, appellant harbored a specific intent to arouse and gratify his own sexual desire”
- stating that "[w]hen the proponent has other compelling or undisputed evidence to establish the proposition or fact that the extraneous misconduct goes to prove, the misconduct evidence will weigh far less than it otherwise might in the probative-versus-prejudicial balance"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by a later decision (1995)
Therefore, we decline to adopt the Montgomery test in civil cases.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Charles Bunton v. State (2004)
Montgomery is distinguishable from the instant case.
Distinguished by Powell v. State, 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 117 (2001)
Nothing in Montgomery indicates that its admissibility analysis is inapplicable if a defensive theory is raised in a defendant’s opening statement.
Distinguished by Harrell v. State, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 104 (1994)
” Id. at 391. Montgomery is distinguishable because it does not concern quantum of proof, and nothing in Montgomery abolishes the requirement of a quantum of proof regarding extraneous offenses.
The opinion
TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
Believing that the majority opinion does nothing less than to make the waters of extraneous offenses murkier than ever before in the history of this State’s criminal jurisprudence on the subject, I respectfully dissent. Also see Boutwell v. State, 719 S.W.2d 164, 187 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (Teague, J., concurring opinion); Robinson v. State, 701 S.W.2d 895, 901 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (Clinton, J., opinion joining the judgment of the Court); and Morrow v. State, 735 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987).