holding that, in an appeal of a trial court’s denial of a post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal, “we examine the sufficiency of the evidence by viewing it in its entirety and by giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence in its favor”
How later courts described this case
- holding that, in an appeal of a trial court’s denial of a post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal, “we examine the sufficiency of the evidence by viewing it in its entirety and by giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence in its favor”
- finding prosecutorial remarks criticizing the testimony of a similar mitigation expert proper, where the expert failed to consult any mental health professionals such as a psychologist or psychiatrist in preparing her report
- holding that State was entitled to expose bias, inaccuracy, and incompleteness of mitigating expert's social history testimony
- finding Caldwell violation may exist when prosecutor's "remarks to the jury on the death penalty improperly described the role assigned to them under state law"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LONG, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join in Justice Coleman’s thoughtful opinion that would impose a higher standard for the use of circumstantial evidence to prove “own conduct” in a capital case.
I write separately to express my disagreement with the conclusion expressed in Point IV of the majority opinion that because the death penalty was declared constitutional in State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123 , 524 A.2d 188 (1987), that issue is resolved. In my view, and for the reasons I have previously expressed in detail, the constitutionality of the New Jersey death penalty requires reassessment. State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448 , 776 A.2d 144 (2001) (Long, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, I am not urging a wholesale departure “from our well-established precedent.” Rather, I am reiterating my view that it is time to revisit Ramseur , a decision rooted in conclusions about “evolving standards of decency” vis-á-vis the death penalty, to take into account changes in our collective consciousness since it was decided.
Indeed, as amici point out, a recent survey by the highly respected Eagleton Center for Public Interest Polling, a project of the Institute of Politics of Rutgers University, provides compelling evidence that community consensus against the death penalty is continuing to evolve. Eagleton Institute of Politics, New Jersey- *163 ans’ Opinions on a Death Penalty Moratorium (May 2002) [hereinafter Eagleton Survey].
The study, based on interviews conducted with 803 New Jersey residents in May 2002, evinces a significant decrease in support for the death penalty. It shows that 60 percent of New Jersey residents support the death penalty as punishment for murder. Id. at 1. Sixty-three percent supported it when the issue was studied in 1999. Id. at 2. When we last considered the constitutionality of the death penalty, the then most recent surveys, conducted in 1977 and 1981 by the Eagleton Poll, showed public support for this State’s death penalty at 72 percent. See State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123 , 174 n. 10, 524 A.2d 188 (1987).
When presented with the alternative of life in prison without parole, the public’s support for the death penalty dropped to 36 percent, down from 44 percent in 1999. Eagleton Survey at 3. Moreover, as in prior years, New Jersey residents are less likely than other Americans to prefer the death penalty over life in prison without parole. Ibid. In addition, 66 percent of New Jersey residents — including 60 percent of those who favor the death penalty overall — favor a temporary halt to executions while a study is conducted to ascertain whether the death penalty is being administered accurately, fairly, and economically. Id. at 4.
The majority’s reliance on our legislature’s inaction regarding the death penalty as “the best and most reliable indicator” of contemporary values is mysterious in light of its citation to the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), which held, among other things, that a national consensus has developed in the last thirteen years against the execution of mentally retarded persons. 1 Despite that national consensus, our capital legislation still authorizes the execution of the mentally retarded, indicat *164 ing that, at least as far as the United States Supreme Court is concerned, our legislature is out of synchronicity with “evolving standards of decency.” Id. at -, 122 S.Ct. at 2247 , 135 L.Ed.2d at-(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 , 78 S.Ct. 590, 598 , 2 L.Ed.2d 630, 642 (1958)).
I am equally puzzled over the majority’s suggestion that the “actions of juries” support its conclusion that community standards have not undergone a sea change. The statistics cited by the majority are meaningless unless they are compared to previous numbers:
One final observation regarding contemporary standards of decency involves Ramseur’s conclusion that it is “a true reflection of society’s morality” that twenty-six juries in New Jersey imposed the death penalty from 1982 to 1987. 106 N.J. at 173 , 524 A.2d 188 . Based on that figure, if public standards remained constant, at least sixty-two death sentences would have been expected between 1987 and 1999. In fact, only tweniy-six death sentences were imposed during that period, Hon. David S. Baime, Report of the Special Master on Proportionality Review: State v. Thomas Koskovich 1a (Jan. 24, 2000), obviously reflecting a diminishing level of support for that extreme sanction among our fellow citizens.
[State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 580 , 776 A.2d 144 (2001) (Long, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).]
Coupled with what we now know about the death penalty’s failure to deter criminals, those changed circumstances underscore the need to reconsider Ramseur. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner & Ford Fessenden, States With No Death Penalty Share Lower Homicide Rates, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2000 (“homicide rates had risen and fallen along roughly symmetrical paths, suggesting to many experts that the threat of the death penalty rarely deters criminals”).
I remain mystified by the Court’s resistance to revisiting a fifteen-year-old opinion that, by its very terms, was rooted in conclusions about the public’s appetite for the death penalty that appear to have changed. The suggestion that the Court’s past perfunctory rejection of equally perfunctory challenges to Ramseur over the years gives currency to that opinion is neither jurisprudentially sustainable nor an appropriate response to a case *165 involving the ultimate sanction of death. Ante at 138, 803 A.2d at 1130.
For affirmance in part, reversal in part & remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices STEIN, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI — 5.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part — Justices COLEMAN and LONG — 2.