Opinion

Stomel v. City of Camden

  • 192 N.J. 137
  • 927 A.2d 129
  • 26 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 705
  • 2007 N.J. LEXIS 909
Court
Supreme Court of New Jersey
Filed
Jul 25, 2007
Status
Published
Author
Rivera-Soto
On the bench
Lavecchia, Rivera-Soto
Cited by
30 cases
Authority
More cited than 13.2%

explaining that "a municipality generally cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action for the acts of employees under the principle of respondeat superior" unless "an official municipal 'policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,' is the cause of the constitutional A-4112-19 18 deprivation" (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978))

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that "a municipality generally cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action for the acts of employees under the principle of respondeat superior" unless "an official municipal 'policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,' is the cause of the constitutional A-4112-19 18 deprivation" (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978))
  • explaining the circumstances under which a municipality can be held liable for the civil rights violations of its employees
  • finding a municipal public defender was required to "exercise independent professional judgment" without city supervision
  • public defender who had his own office was nevertheless engaged to fulfill municipality's public defender function required by the Municipal Public Defender's Act, N.J.S.A. 2B:24-1 to -17, and therefore could be considered an employee under CEPA

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

*157 Justice RIVERA-SOTO,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

In respect of plaintiff Elliot Stomel’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Camden and its City Council, I concur with both the reasoning and result set forth in parts I and II of the majority’s opinion.

However, to the extent the majority, in part III of the majority’s opinion, resurrects plaintiffs claims against the City and City Council pursuant to the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8, I respectfully dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissent in D’Annunzio v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 192 N.J. 110, 127-37 , 927 A.2d 113, 123-29 (2007), also decided today.

For reversal in Part II — Chief Justice ZAZZALI and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS — 7.

For affirmance in Part III — Chief Justice ZAZZALI and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE and HOENS — 6.

For reversal in Part III — Justices RIVERA-SOTO — 1.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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