overruling previous cases regarding the burden of proof required to show voluntariness of a confession under the United States Constitution
How later courts described this case
- overruling previous cases regarding the burden of proof required to show voluntariness of a confession under the United States Constitution
- procedure for challenging admissibility of confession in Indiana has traditionally been the in-trial objection
- totality of the circumstances test
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Smith v. State, 1997 Ind. LEXIS 243 (1997)
335 N.E.2d 811 (Ind. 1975), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1238
The opinion
Opinion Concurring in Result, Dissenting in Part
Arterburn, J.
I concur in the result reached in this case, but not the language therein which states that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a confession was voluntary in the collateral hearing before the judge to determine the admissibility of the confession,
*642 The trial judge’s preliminary hearing on admissibility in such a case does not go to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Therefore, the standard that the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary is not applicable, but only one of a preponderance of the evidence. It is when the evidence of the confession is submitted to the jury and the jury determines its credibility that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary.
I realize that previously in Burton v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 94 , 292 N.E.2d 790 , Justice Hunter speaking for this Court said the State on the issue of admissibility has a “heavy burden” to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was given voluntarily. Of course, this is true in the trial before the jury, but in my opinion, this has no application to a collateral issue of admissibility heard by the trial judge. In this reasoning I am supported by the recent United States Supreme Court case of Lego v. Twomey, (1972) 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 , which has held that the standard for the judge to determine the voluntariness of a confession for admissibility is not the same standard a jury uses for conviction. The judge merely determines the voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. There is no issue of guilt or innocence involved in the hearing before the trial judge on the issue of voluntariness. Therefore, proof beyond a reasonable doubt has no application. When the issue goes to the jury, of course, the proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt before a conviction can be supported.
Givan, C.J., concurs.
Note. — Reported at 335 N.E.2d 811 .