where this court concluded that 16 independent-living units connected to a dependent-care unit by a main hallway did not qualify for charitable-use exemption by virtue of fees charged to residents even though the dependent-care unit qualified for the exemption
How later courts described this case
- where this court concluded that 16 independent-living units connected to a dependent-care unit by a main hallway did not qualify for charitable-use exemption by virtue of fees charged to residents even though the dependent-care unit qualified for the exemption
- first amendment precludes judicial involvement in the internal autonomy of religious organizations
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE LUND, concurring in part, and dissenting in part:
I would affirm the trial court except as to future decisions by the Board of Review.
The majority decision correctly states the facts. There is one real purpose for the operation of Fairview Haven, to provide a resident care facility, operated under the guidelines of a church order for the benefit of the elderly, regardless of financial ability. It is time we recognize that providing a home for the elderly, without a profit motive, with an administration based on religious teachings, which includes loving care for the elderly, is a charitable purpose.
There is no doubt that the elderly may not have the physical or mental abilities to adequately maintain independent living. Snow removal, home repair, lawn care, obtaining food and supplies, physical care, and cleanliness can all become great burdens. Couple the natural trauma of aging with these frustrations and you have emotional upheaval. Worry can become a constant companion. The picture outlined applies to people in all walks of life, all social levels, all economic levels, and to people of all or no religious faith. I suggest that those who doubt the existence of this turmoil have spent most of their lives in a closet.
A program holding out security and help to the aged certainly accomplishes a social interest. It certainly advances a purpose beneficial to the public. It appears to aid people and seek to improve their condition. Is not there an amelioration of persons in unfortunate circumstances? See the definition of “charity” (Black’s Law Dictionary 296 (4th ed. 1968)).
Section 19.7 of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.7), uses the words “when such property is actually and exclusively used for charitable or beneficent purposes, and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit.”
. “Charitable” is defined as “[hjaving the character or purpose of a charity.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 295 (4th ed. 1968).) One of the definitions of “charity” is “[a]ny scheme or effort to better the condition of society or any considerable part thereof.” Black’s Law Dictionary 296 (4th ed. 1968).
I find fault with an interpretation, in this case, which would in effect declare the providing of an apartment, located within a loving and concerned complex for the handicapped or elderly, to be noncharitable because the benefactor can pay for the initial cost of the space. The evidence clearly shows much more is being provided than independent-living quarters. Security, freedom from household worries, immediate assistance if needed, food service, and religious services are available, all without the presence of the profit motive.
Charity extends to more than the poor. The unfortunate include those with or without funds. One may be in need and still have sufficient clothes and a full stomach. For one who is of deep religious devotion, he or she may be more distressed by being unable to attend church than going without food. Every bit of evidence before this court indicates that Fairview Haven, in every part of the structure, is seeking to accomplish a social benefit, which generally affects the public, without the motives of profitable gain.
It is suggested that this dissent is consistent with the decision of our supreme court in People ex rel. Nordlund v. Association of the Winnebago Home for the Aged (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 91, 99 , 237 N.E.2d 533, 538 . The overall program at Fairview Haven has been to benefit the aged. The independent housing provides for those who no longer have the ability to maintain separate homes or apartments but are not yet ready to go into a group living or nursing-care environment. The deposit is commensurate with the cost, but has been waived. Nordlund recognized “that charging fees and dispensing benefits to other than those who are poverty stricken does not cause an institution to lose its charitable character.” 40 Ill. 2d 91, 101 , 237 N.E.2d 533, 539 .
It appears that Fairview Haven used its fees to support all of the residents, still showing a net loss. The record indicates that actual practice resulted in equal treatment regardless of the financial ability of the residents. The $300 admission fee had been waived but in any case was insignificant. It is not comparable to the $4,000 fee referred to in the 1968 case of Nordlund. The $300 fee was withdrawn when the directors became aware of the Department of Revenue’s objection. It should not be criticized. It served as nothing more than an incentive to honor a commitment to move into the home.
For the reasons given, I would hold the entire properties of Fair-view Haven as charitable under the provisions of section 19.7. While it is not necessary to discover the question of “religious use,” I do find that the evidence is strong and compelling in favor of the appellee.