concluding, in dicta, that the approach taken in Thornton and other federal courts restricting Daubert in favor of a conventional Rule 702 analysis was reasonable
How later courts described this case
- concluding, in dicta, that the approach taken in Thornton and other federal courts restricting Daubert in favor of a conventional Rule 702 analysis was reasonable
- explaining that extensive cross-examination better aids the jury in performing its function than exclusion of relevant evidence
- noting the lack 7 of statistical proof concerning a drug’s effectiveness for treating a condition goes to the weight of an expert’s testimony and not to its admissibility
- Iowa’s Rule 702, which is exactly the same as N.J.R.E. 702, is a “liberal rule on the admission for expert testimony”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NEUMAN, Justice
(concurring).
As the majority readily acknowledges, it was drawn into a Daubert analysis because of the way the parties argued this case in the trial court and on appeal. I concur but write separately to emphasize that the majority’s thorough and scholarly application of Dau-bert should not be misinterpreted as an endorsement of its framework for analysis in future cases. Our own common-law interpretation of Iowa rule of evidence 702 — historically unencumbered by reliance on the federal Frye test — has served us well and will continue to do so.