stating that legislative intent and meaning of statute is derived from nature of subject matter, contextual setting, and relationship to statutes in pari materia as well as cognate statutes in order to create "symmetrical system"
How later courts described this case
- stating that legislative intent and meaning of statute is derived from nature of subject matter, contextual setting, and relationship to statutes in pari materia as well as cognate statutes in order to create "symmetrical system"
- “Alfthis [common law or statutory history] reveals the essential quality of murder as a single offense, divided by the statute . . . into degrees, first and second, for the purpose of punishment alone, according to the gravity and heinousness of the felonious act, the moral obliquity that determines the difference between express and implied malice. . . . These statutes have not altered the nature of murder at common law; they are concerned only with the character of the punishment; the degrees do not constitute separate and distinct crimes, but merely grades of the same offense. Murder in either of the statutory degrees is murder at common law.” [Citations omitted.]
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Waoheneeld, J.
(dissenting). I would affirm the judgment below principally for the reason recited by Judge *417 Leonard at the trial level on the motion in arrest of judgment. The law as he states it, in my opinion, is clear, correct, and impressively expressed.
I agree with the majority when it says “the sense of a law is to be gathered from its object and the nature of the subject matter, the contextual setting, and the statutes in pari materia.” I subscribe also to its pronouncement:
“While penal and criminal statutes are to be strictly read to avoid penalties by construction, and a statute of limitation is to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose and, corollarially, an exception to the general limitation is to be given a narrow scope, * *
How the majority can then jump from these basic interpretations to add something to the enactment in question in criminal procedure that was left out by the Legislature is beyond my comprehension.
N. J. S. 2A :113-2 distinguishes and defines the degrees of murder, first-degree murder being “murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which is committed in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate arson, burglary, kidnapping, rape, robbery or sodomy.” Second-degree murder is defined to be “any other kind of murder.”
In addition to there being a difference in the crime itself as the elements are totally different, there is likewise a difference in punishment. State v. Bunk, 4 N. J. 461 (1950).
Moreover, the existence of separate elements and that facts warranting conviction of one degree do not necessarily warrant a conviction of the other differentiates second-degree murder, as an “offense not punishable by death,” from the situation where the jury finds in the first degree but recommends life imprisonment. N. J. S. 2A :113-4. Clearly, in the latter situation the lesser degree of punishment is imposed as a pure act of clemency and not because the jury came to a factual conclusion not justifying the death penalty.
*418 The statute of limitations provides:
* 33 n0 person shall he prosecuted, tried or punished for any offense not punishable with death, unless the indictment therefor shall be found within 2 years from the time of committing the offense * * (Subsequently enlarged to five years)
There are only three offenses in our law punishable by death: ñrst-degree murder, kidnapping, treason, and the prisoner was not convicted of any of these.
A statute enlarging liberty is to be liberally construed, but a statute restricting liberty is to be strictly construed.
I would affirm the judgment below.
For reversal — Justices Heheb, Oliphant, Bukliitg and Jacobs — 4.
For affirmance — Justice Wacheneelb — 1.