holding failure to comply strictly with the statutory procedures of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 911/2, par. 1 — 100 et seq.) is procedural, not jurisdictional, error "despite the substantial liberty interests at stake in such a proceeding”
How later courts described this case
- holding failure to comply strictly with the statutory procedures of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 911/2, par. 1 — 100 et seq.) is procedural, not jurisdictional, error "despite the substantial liberty interests at stake in such a proceeding”
- court rejected a contention that reliance on hearsay statements, the absence of a medical report, and the disregard of several other statutory requirements violated constitutional rights and rendered a disability and guardianship order void
- brother of individual adjudicated as a disabled adult had standing under sections 11a — 10 and 11a — 20 of the Probate Act to file a motion to contest the original disability and guardianship order and to appeal from denial of that motion
- guardianship or der void for lack of personal jurisdiction may be attacked either directly or collaterally at any time
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
Joseph Steinfeld appealed from the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate the order adjudicating his brother, David, a disabled adult and appointing a guardian. The facts which form the basis of his appeal are that the probate division of the circuit court failed to comply with several statutory requirements of the Probate Act of 1975 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 1101/2, par. 11a — 1 et seq.) prior to the adjudication proceeding. In this appeal, Joseph maintains that the court’s failure to comply with these requirements violated David’s constitutional rights and rendered the disability and guardianship order void. 158 Ill. 2d at 12.
The majority acknowledges that the petition to adjudicate David disabled was deficient in several ways. Specifically, the majority notes that: (1) the petition was not accompanied by a report describing the nature and extent of David’s physical and mental disability; (2) no evaluation was ordered by the court prior to the hearing; (3) David was neither present at the hearing nor represented by a guardian ad litem or other counsel; (4) the trial court did not inquire about or rule upon whether there was good cause for David’s absence from the hearing; and (5) the trial court did not make a determination that the appointment of a guardian ad litem was unnecessary for David’s protection. 158 Ill. 2d at 11.
The majority concludes that the trial court’s jurisdiction to enter the order of disability and guardianship was proper and that, therefore, the order was not void. Having so concluded, the majority correctly holds that the order is not subject to collateral attack.
The majority then, however, incorrectly concludes that "because there is no contention that David is not a disabled adult under the definition of the Act, in light of Joseph’s statements and conduct prior to the filing of his motion to vacate, including his petition for modification of the very order he now asserts was void ab initio, and since the court implemented measures for David’s protection as a result of that petition, *** David has not been deprived of his rights by entry of the original guardianship order.” 158 Ill. 2d at 18.
The majority’s conclusion with respect to the deprivation of David’s rights in the original proceeding cannot be supported by events which occurred subsequent to that proceeding. David was most certainly deprived of his rights by entry of the original order. Regardless of the meritoriousness of the original guardianship petition or the propriety of the court’s order in the original proceeding, the fact of the deprivation is not negated. The issue in this case is resolved simply by the majority’s recognition that the petitioner’s objections to the deficiencies in the original guardianship proceeding are not subject to collateral attack. Nothing more is required. The majority’s additional "bootstrap” rationale to address the deficiencies in the original proceeding is both unnecessary and incorrect.