holding plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence of extreme emotional distress to submit claim to a jury where plaintiff “was very, very down, feeling super badly, and felt that he [had] lost everything”
How later courts described this case
- holding plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence of extreme emotional distress to submit claim to a jury where plaintiff “was very, very down, feeling super badly, and felt that he [had] lost everything”
- concluding that although the plaintiff felt “super badly” and “very down,” the plaintiffs symptoms were not enough to establish a prima facie case for severe distress
- finding “substantial evidence in the record to establish a question for the trier of fact on whether [the defendant] breached his fiduciary duty to the [plaintiffs]”
- recognizing a trend away from the harsh rule that acceptance of a judgment invariably waives the right to appeal
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LeGRAND, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from Divisions IV, V, and IX(A) of the majority opinion and from the results which those divisions dictate.
Division IV deals with Gordon Russell’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty. This issue was submitted on four separate theories. I believe there was substantial evidence on only one — the manner in which Russell bought out Poulsen in January 1977. The jury should have been limited to considering that matter only.
Because this inevitably affected the jury’s award of both actual and punitive damages, I dissent also from Division V, which deals with the sufficiency of evidence on damages.
Division IX(A) discusses the effect of discovery admissions. Poulsen submitted a request for admissions, asking Russell to concede certain real estate “would become the asset of two individual persons, Paul Poul-sen and Gordon Russell.” Russell admitted this. At trial, Poulsen claimed — successfully — that he owned all of this real estate. Russell asserts title was conclusively settled by the earlier request and admission. See rule 128, Iowa R.Civ.P. I, too, think it was.
The majority relies on the general rule that an admission is binding only on the party who makes it. This would seem to require no great citation of authority. I do not dispute the rule, only its application to these facts.
Here the very request was an admission and should be so treated. Poulsen conceded they each owned an interest in the realty by asking Russell to make that admission. How can this be treated as an admission by Russell but not by Poulsen?
Aside from the fact the authorities cited are distinguishable because they did not contemplate the circumstances facing us, there is a matter of elementary fairness to be considered, particularly when Poulsen is himself demanding exemplary conduct from Russell. How does Russell prepare to defend against a claim which, by Poulsen’s admission, does not exist? If Poulsen agrees that each own an interest in the property, as the contract itself provided, then there is no issue as to title to real estate. Russell was justified in relying on *302 this. This is the very purpose of rule 128, Iowa R.Civ.P., which I believe should control the case. The result reached by the majority is unfair and unwarranted.