stating that to determine whether a bystander may recover for emotional distress a court should consider whether “[t]he emotional distress resulted from a direct emotional impact from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence”
How later courts described this case
- stating that to determine whether a bystander may recover for emotional distress a court should consider whether “[t]he emotional distress resulted from a direct emotional impact from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence”
- recognizing that compensable mental distress should ordinarily be accom panied with physical manifestations of distress
- recognizing tortfeasor’s liability to a bystander who suffers “serious” mental distress, which ordinarily would be mental distress accompanied by physical manifestations of the distress
- recognizing that compensable mental distress should ordinarily be accom *408 panied with physical manifestations of distress
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*109 ALLBEE, Justice
(dissenting).
Until today a damage action for the emotional distress of an unendangéred bystander who witnessed the negligent infliction of harm on another person was not recognized as a tort in this state. I am unwilling to join the court in its embracing of this beguiling concept. It is complex, fraught with problems and difficult to administer, as is conceded by even its most ardent supporters. E.g., W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, § 54 at 328-30, 333-35 (4th ed. 1971). Substantial factors militating against the cause of action include the remoteness of emotional distress from the negligent act, the fictional duty of one person to prevent another from being frightened by what he may by chance observe, the problem of the foreseeability of who may be distressed by an act, the nearly limitless possibilities for liability as well as the potential for fraudulent, collusive and nuisance claims. There is no point, however, in belaboring these concerns as they already have been the subject of considerable discussion by respectable authority. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 748-52 , 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 85-88 , 441 P.2d 912, 925-28 (1968) (Burke, J., dissenting); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 553-55 (Minn.1980); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 613-19 , 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556-62 , 249 N.E.2d 419, 421-24 (1969); Whetham v. Bismarck Hospital, 197 N.W.2d 678, 680-85 (N.D.1972); Shelton v. Russell Pipe and Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861, 862-66 (Tenn.1978); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash.2d 52, 55-57 , 530 P.2d 291, 293-94 (1975). But neither these authorities nor I have succeeded in dissuading this court. Thus, I now simply record that I am not a party to the opening of this “Pandora’s box.”
LeGRAND, J., joins in this dissent.