whether candidate abandoned established residence is a question of intent, and "`an absence for months or even years, if all the while intended as a mere temporary absence for some temporary purpose, to be followed by a resumption of the former residence, will not be an abandonment'" (quoting Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141, 195, 17 N.E. 232 (1888))
How later courts described this case
- whether candidate abandoned established residence is a question of intent, and "`an absence for months or even years, if all the while intended as a mere temporary absence for some temporary purpose, to be followed by a resumption of the former residence, will not be an abandonment'" (quoting Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141, 195, 17 N.E. 232 (1888))
- whether candidate abandoned estabhshed residence is a question of intent, and “ ‘an absence for months, or even years, if all the while intended as a mere temporary absence for some temporary purpose, to be followed by a resumption of the former residence, will not be an abandonment’ ” (quoting Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141, 195 (1888))
- whether candidate abandoned established residence is a question of intent, and “ ‘an absence for months or even years, if all the while intended as a mere temporary absence for some temporary purpose, to be followed by a resumption of the former -9- residence, will not be an abandonment’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Mina v. Board of Education for Homewood-Flossmoor, Community High School District 233, 348 Ill. App. 3d 264 (2004)
However, Kreitz (as well as Stein v. County Board of School Trustees, 40 Ill. 2d 477 (1968), and Dillavou v. County Officers Electoral Board, 260 Ill. App. 3d 127 (1994), which rely on Kreitz and which Mihaela also cites) is inapposite to the instant case.
The opinion
JUSTICE LUND, dissenting:
"Residence,” as referred to by the framers of the 1970 Constitution, appears to be equivalent to the residence requirement for voters. The opinions of our supreme court dealing with the definition of "residence” have basically related to voters. (Kreitz, 125 Ill. at 195, 17 N.E. at 253; Park, 374 Ill. at 43, 27 N.E.2d at 842; Coffey v. Board of Election Commissioners (1940), 375 Ill. 385, 387-88 , 31 N.E.2d 588, 589 ; Clark, 377 Ill. at 426-27, 36 N.E.2d at 565; Messman v. Newman Township High School District No. 150 (1942), 379 Ill. 32, 38-39 , 39 N.E.2d 332, 336 ; Tuthill v. Rendelman (1944), 387 Ill. 321, 341 , 56 N.E.2d 375, 386 ; Stein, 40 Ill. 2d at 479-80, 240 N.E.2d at 669.) There is no reason to believe a different interpretation was intended by the convention. Intent is a factor to consider. (Stein, 40 Ill. 2d at 479-80, 240 N.E.2d at 669.) However, the intent to be a resident is of importance, not the intent to be eligible for candidacy. Residency is required by the constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 2(c).
Here, it is apparent that the rented apartment was intended to be temporary, while a more appropriate home could be found for the family. The family home, outside the 100th district, was still owned and occupied by the family. Curran continued his marital relationship and his family relationship. Little changed in the marital home, except that Curran spent some time in the temporary apartment (apparently only to qualify as a candidate for the 100th district). Would not this evidence result in a decision that Curran was a resident of, and could register and vote from, the family residence? Could not the same evidence sustain Curran’s right to run for election in the 99th district? I suggest the answer to each of these questions is yes.
"A real and not an imaginary abode occupied as his home or dwelling, we have held, is essential to satisfy the residential qualifications prescribed by law.” (Coffey, 375 Ill. at 387 , 31 N.E.2d at 589 .) "[A] permanent abode is necessary to constitute a residence within the contemplation of the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions.” (Coffey, 375 Ill. at 387 , 31 N.E.2d at 589 , citing Pope v. Board of Election Commissioners (1938), 370 Ill. 196, 199 , 18 N.E.2d 214, 215 .) A temporary removal from a residence does not result in a change of location for voter registration. See Coffey, 375 Ill. at 387 , 31 N.E.2d at 589 ; Messman, 379 Ill. at 39 , 39 N.E.2d at 336 ; Clark, 377 Ill. at 427, 36 N.E.2d at 565.
The majority opinion is an incorrect interpretation of the constitutional provision. We should not interpret the restrictive provision of the constitution to mean that a person from one district can declare an intent to run for a representative or senate seat in another and be allowed on the ballot because of the part-time use of a rented apartment, while maintaining a family in another residence outside the district. I suggest the result of the majority’s incorrect interpretation invites problems in the future.