The opinion
JUSTICE NASH, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent having concluded from the record of the sentencing hearing that the trial judge improperly considered the then pending charges in Kane County in imposing sentence.
As noted by the majority, arrests or pending charges will not ordinarily be considered in determining the length of a sentence. (See People v. Fritz (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6 , rev’d on other grounds (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 72 ; People v. Smothers (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 589, 591 ; see also People v. Siefke (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 14 .) Generally it is presumed that a sentencing judge will disregard information improperly included within a presentence report, but that presumption is rebutted if the record reflects the court did, in fact, consider such evidence. (E.g., People v. Brown (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 163 (court made specific reference to evidence); People v. De Groot (1968), 108 Ill. App. 2d 1 (court overruled objection to evidence).) In the present case, the trial judge expressly referred to and reviewed defendant’s conduct in Kane County for which charges were then pending. It cannot, therefore, be presumed that conduct of defendant did not, in part, form a basis for the severe sentences imposed.
I would remand for a new sentencing hearing to be certain defendant was not sentenced in both Du Page and Kane counties for the same conduct. Compare People v. Poll (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 286, 289 .