finding race was a central feature of the case "given the multiple racially motivated statements attributed to defendant," such as referring to the victim as a "white bitch" and that he had "knocked off some white girl," and the crime itself, which "appeared to have been racially motivated"
How later courts described this case
- finding race was a central feature of the case "given the multiple racially motivated statements attributed to defendant," such as referring to the victim as a "white bitch" and that he had "knocked off some white girl," and the crime itself, which "appeared to have been racially motivated"
- finding the trial court's failure to give a Kociolek charge was not plain error because opposing counsel's "devastating cross-examination" accomplished the principal goal of the Kociolek charge, which is to "to cast a skeptical eye on the sources of inculpatory statements attributed to a defendant."
- holding trial court did not abuse discretion in excluding past conduct evidence under Rule 403 because evidence had minimal probative value, incidents occurred years earlier, and evidence "would only divert attention from the true issues" in case
- suggesting that the defense counsel work with the court to reduce excessive number of alleged mitigating factors by grouping such *434 factors into smaller number of discrete categories, which would be submitted to jury
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STEIN, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority opinion accurately describes the judiciary’s responsibility to guarantee a fair trial despite the exercise by the press of its constitutional right to circulate inherently prejudicial publicity before and during a trial.
In an ideal world a free press would seek to foster fair trial rights by not circulating inherently prejudicial publicity at least during a time of trial. If this cannot be so, courts must guarantee the preservation of fair trial rights without any restraint of the editorial ¡freedom of the press.
[Ante at 147, 716 A.2d at 470-71 (citation omitted).]
*211 I fully agree with Justice Handler’s conclusion that the trial court’s refusal to take adequate preventative measures to address the prejudicial effects of the midtrial publicity compromised defendant’s right to a fair trial. In my view, however, the prejudicial effect of the trial court’s inaction undermined only the penalty phase of the trial. I therefore join part 1(c) of Justice Handler’s opinion, but only to the extent that it concludes that defendant’s death sentence be vacated. Accordingly, I would vacate defendant’s death sentence and remand for a new penalty trial. I join the majority opinion in all other respects, to the extent that it is not inconsistent with my conclusion concerning defendant’s death sentence.