stating that, in substantive due process analysis of retroactive statute, New Jersey courts should balance the importance of the public interest as compared with the value of the right affected by the statute to determine if the legislature reasonably exercised its police power or whether it violated substantive due process by enacting particularly harsh and oppressive legislation
How later courts described this case
- stating that, in substantive due process analysis of retroactive statute, New Jersey courts should balance the importance of the public interest as compared with the value of the right affected by the statute to determine if the legislature reasonably exercised its police power or whether it violated substantive due process by enacting particularly harsh and oppressive legislation
- explaining "'[t]here can be no vested right in the continued existence of a statute or rule of the common law which precludes its change or repeal'" (quoting Savarese v. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 235 N.J. Super. 298, 309 (App. Div. 1989))
- holding that retroactive application of statute turns on legislative intent and whether retroactivity works either an unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice
- holding that retroactive application of statute turns on legislative intent and whether retroactivity works either unconstitutional interference with vested rights or manifest injustice
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Kaho'ohanohano ex rel. Morales-Kaho'ohanohano v. Department of Human Services, 117 Haw. 262 (2008)
Phillips, however, is distinguishable.
The opinion
CLIFFORD, J.,
dissenting in part.
Only from so much of the Court’s otherwise straightforward and eminently sensible opinion as attempts to come to grips with the slippery doctrine of retroactivity do I dissent. See Part IV, ante at 620-628, 608 A.2d 901 -905. I join in the judgment because I agree that the Legislature did not intend that N.J.S.A. 38A:13-1.2 apply to plaintiff’s claim. See ante at 619, 608 A. 2d 901 .
Not only is the discussion of retroactivity in Part IV unnecessary to the Court’s disposition of the appeal, as the opinion readily acknowledges, ante at 620, 608 A. 2d 901 , it is entirely irrelevant. “Retroactivity” has nothing to do with this case. The problem is not one of applying today’s legislation to cases that antedate the effective date of the legislation; rather, the question is whether, by the very terms of its enactment, the Legislature has itself applied the statute to a given situation— here, plaintiff’s case. The Court has correctly decided that the statute does not apply. I would not further muddy the already-murky waters of retroactivity analysis.
For reversal and, remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7,
Opposed — None.