stating that a motion to suppress that raised both federal and state search and seizure provisions was sufficient to preserve state constitutional claim when oral argument covered only the federal constitutional claim
How later courts described this case
- stating that a motion to suppress that raised both federal and state search and seizure provisions was sufficient to preserve state constitutional claim when oral argument covered only the federal constitutional claim
- relying on federal precedent in holding that a "totality of the circumstances" test was applicable in determining probable cause for a warrantless search, and stating that "... today's opinion is made to stay in step with the federal constitutional model for probable cause determinations"
- holding that imprecise objection will be sufficient to preserve error if grounds for the objection are obvious to the court or opposing counsel
- holding that the clear thrust of the argument at trial is the basis for deciding if the argument has been sufficiently raised for appeal
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Heitman v. State, 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (1991)
754 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), overruled on other grounds, Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Crim.App.1991);
The opinion
DUNCAN, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that neither Art. I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution or Art. 18.01, V.A.C.C.P., require that an affidavit based upon hearsay must comport with the Aguilar-Spinelli doctrine. Further, I find that Judge McCormick’s textual analysis, in this instance, review of prior state case law, and the applicable state statute appropriate and commendable. These are the methods of review, among others, that this Court should follow in examining our Constitution. See Hans Linde, “E Pluribus — Constitutional Theory and State Courts,” in Developments in State Constitutional Law: The Williamsburg Conference, ed. Bradley D. McGraw (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1985) pp. 227-305.
However, I do object to the majority’s comment that his case was decided as it was in order “to stay in step with the federal constitutional model for probable cause determinations.” There is no constitutional requirement that this Court specifically adopt either the reasoning or the holding in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Consequently, there is no reason for this Court to feel compelled to “stay in step with the federal constitutional model for probable cause determinations.”
The United States Supreme Court is not the infallible institution that this Court on occasion has assumed it to be. For example, a plurality of this Court in Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) stated: “[T]his court has opted to interpret our Constitution in harmony with the Supreme Court’s opinions interpreting the Fourth Amendment.” Id., at 799 . Osban v. State, 726 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). I am unwilling to be so arbitrarily submissive.
Because the Supreme Court is not invested with divine guidance, there is nothing inherently improper in state court opinion diverging from Supreme Court authority on the very simple basis that there is a viable disagreement on the matter of interpretation. As Professor Robert Williams has commented: “Our system of federalism has always contemplated such disagreement.” Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.L.Rev. 353, 368 (1984).
If I had concluded that Art. I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution or Art. 18.01 V.A.C.C.P. required strict adherence to the Aguilar-Spinelli doctrine I would not hesitate to so state despite Illinois v. Gates, supra.
With these comments I concur.
MILLER and CAMPBELL, JJ., join.