Opinion

Farnum v. GD Searle & Co., Inc.

  • 339 N.W.2d 392
  • 1983 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1708
Court
Supreme Court of Iowa
Filed
Oct 19, 1983
Status
Published
Author
Reynoldson
On the bench
McCormick, Reynoldson, Reynold-Son, Larson
Cited by
21 cases
Authority
More cited than 13.0%

holding an action was barred by the limitations period where the time period to commence the action had passed prior to the accrual date

How later courts described this case

  • holding an action was barred by the limitations period where the time period to commence the action had passed prior to the accrual date
  • "The trial court in the present case predicted that, *808upon reconsideration, a majority of this court would now vote to overrule Montgomery and adopt the view of the dissenters in that case. This prediction is incorrect. The court adheres to the holding in Montgomery ...."
  • “The trial court in the present case predicted that, upon reconsideration, a majority of this court would now vote to overrule Montgomery and adopt the view of the dissenters in that case. This prediction is incorrect. The court adheres to the holding in Montgomery . . . .”
  • cataloging cases from other jurisdictions which constitute "persuasive authority for upholding the differential treatment" of section 613A.5

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

REYNOLDSON, Chief Justice

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent from division II of the majority opinion for the same reasons expressed in division II of Justice Larson’s dissent in Montgomery v. Polk County, 278 N.W.2d 911, 920 (Iowa 1979).

I dissent from division III for all of the reasons assigned in my dissent in Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Iowa 1973). Although the majority indicates Iowa’s Lunday decision is supported by the greater weight of authority, a number of recent decisions have rejected the rationale relied on in that opinion. Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 623-24 , 194 N.W.2d 700, 702 (1972); Kossak v. Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30, 34-35 (Minn.1979) (statutory requirement that suit against city be commenced within one year after notice denied equal protection where the city had actual notice); Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 235 , 510 P.2d 879, 882-83 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 , 94 S.Ct. 598 , 38 L.Ed.2d 486 (1973); Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash.2d 810, 818-19 , 539 P.2d 845, 850 (1975); O’Neil v. City of Parkersburg, 237 S.E.2d 504, 508-09 (W.Va.1977).

I would hold section 613A.5 deprived these plaintiffs of equal protection, and affirm.

LARSON, J., joins this dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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