defining "domicile" as "the place 'where a person has his principal home and place of enjoyment of his fortunes; which he does not expect to leave, except for a purpose; from which when absent, he seems to himself a wayfarer; to which when he returns, he ceases to travel' "
How later courts described this case
- defining "domicile" as "the place 'where a person has his principal home and place of enjoyment of his fortunes; which he does not expect to leave, except for a purpose; from which when absent, he seems to himself a wayfarer; to which when he returns, he ceases to travel' "
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
On Petition To Rehear
McAMIS, Presiding Judge.
Mrs. Snodgrass has filed a petition to rehear which in the main is but a reargument of grounds previously urged for reversal. However, out of deference to counsel we will respond to the insistence that Mr. Snodgrass had not been a resident of Anderson County for one year before the bill for divorce and for that reason is limited to grounds occurring in this state. We held that he was a resident of Anderson County but, upon reading our former opinion, it seems to be only implied that he had *616 been a resident of that county for more than one year before tbe bill was filed. We now hold that he had been a resident of Anderson County for more than one year before the bill was filed.
Where this is so, the complaining spouse is not limited to grounds occurring in Tennessee but may rely on grounds occurring in another state. Carter v. Carter, 113 Tenn. 509, 512 , 82 S. W. 309 ; Gibson’s Suits in Chancery, Higgins and Crownover, Section 1089.
We are satisfied with the result of our former opinion. It results that the petition to rehear is considered to be without merit and is overruled at petitioner’s cost.
Hale and Cooper, JJ., concur.