recognizing that “the Legislature had not defined traveling in its many sessions since we began interpreting it”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that “the Legislature had not defined traveling in its many sessions since we began interpreting it”
- noting that when statutory term is not defined by the statute, court may look to commonly understood definition to determine its plain meaning
- describing common-law exceptions to article 46.02 under which defendant must show that his purpose in 25 carrying was not unlawful
- describing common-law exceptions to article 46.02 under which defendant must show that his purpose in carrying was not unlawful
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
OPINION ON APPELLANTS PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
McCORMICK, Presiding Judge.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of the offense of unlawfully carrying a weapon. Punishment was assessed at a fine of $100 and confinement in the county jail for 180 days, probated for one year. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction. Moosani v. State, 866 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th] 1993). This Court granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review in order to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the requisite proof to qualify for the exception to prosecution for carrying a pistol.
We find that the Court of Appeals’ reasoning is correct and adopt it as our own. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
CLINTON, J., joins the opinion of the Court, observing that contrary to assertions by Judge BAIRD, dissenting at 572-73, the Second Amendment does not grant a right to bear arms unrelated to “a well regulated Militia.” See Masters v. State, 685 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.Cr.App.1985).
OVERSTREET, J., concurs in the result.
WHITE, J., dissents.