holding that for purposes of the law of parties mere presence of the defendant at the scene of the offense will not support a conviction; but, it is a circumstance which, combined with other facts, may show the defendant was a participant
How later courts described this case
- holding that for purposes of the law of parties mere presence of the defendant at the scene of the offense will not support a conviction; but, it is a circumstance which, combined with other facts, may show the defendant was a participant
- holding that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to show that an accused is a party to an offense
- Mere presence alone at the scene of the offense will not support a conviction; however, it is a circumstance which, combined with other facts, may show that the defendant was a participant.
- “[M]ere presence at the scene of the crime is insufficient to prove that a person is a party to the crime . . . .”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DUNCAN, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
My basic opposition to the majority’s opinion is best stated as a question: why *686 was this Petition for Discretionary Review granted in the first place?
In its Petition for Discretionary Review the State in complying with DeGrate v. State, 712 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) asserts as the Reason for Review the following: “The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of state law in conflict with the applicable decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals.” State’s Petition for Discretionary Review, p. 2. For two reasons that just is not true.
First, the Court of Appeals’ decision in this case is unquestionably important to the parties (State and Appellant); however, the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the facts and their relationship to the law in this one case certainly cannot be elevated to a decision concerning an “important decision of state law....” Id.
Second, although the State in mere con-clusory form states that the Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts with “applicable decisions ...,” Id., of this Court these conflicting decisions are not identified. Since the Petition for Discretionary Review does not identify the supposed contradictory opinions there is no way they can be contrasted with the Court of Appeals’ decision. The propriety of contrasting the cases seems too implicit in the reason for review the State advances. In fact, I would hold that when such a reason for review is advanced (by either the State or a defendant) then such a discussion is absolutely necessary for there to be compliance with R. 200(c)(1), Tex.R.App.Pro. In other words, the mere quotation of the rule authorizing review should be deemed insufficient.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding the sufficiency of evidence in this case was erroneous. Therefore, since the Petition for Discretionary Review was granted I concur in its disposition. In the future, however, we should only review Court of Appeals’ decisions regarding sufficiency, of evidence when the party appealing the determination sufficiently pleads and proves that the Court of Appeals in its reasoning “so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, ...” Rule 200(c)(6), Tex.R.App.Pro., as to necessitate this Court’s “power of supervision.” Id.
This Court has neither the legal authority (with a few well-known exceptions), resources, staff, budget, or hopefully the inclination to conduct itself as a direct review court and thereby attempt to rectify all of the inequities that may befall the players that take roles in the Texas criminal justice system. We should only review those Court of Appeals’ decisions that erroneously impact the criminal law of this state. Trying to correct and cure every illness in the system is doomed to fail. By limiting our review to those cases that affect not just the parties but the system will result in both better quality opinions but more importantly, continuity.
CAMPBELL, J., joins this opinion.