finding substantial basis for issuance of warrant to search for evidence of murder committed more than three months earlier when that evidence was in defendant‘s possession seven days prior to warrant‘s issuance
How later courts described this case
- finding substantial basis for issuance of warrant to search for evidence of murder committed more than three months earlier when that evidence was in defendant‘s possession seven days prior to warrant‘s issuance
- observing that, generally, "anyone [may] openly and peaceably" approach the front door of a residence "with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof — whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law"
- finding officers did not conduct a search when they approached defendants’s front door by the only means of access — a driveway— and observed stolen items through uncur-tained windows in the garage
- defining a “public place” as any place where a substantial group of the public has access, including, but not limited to, the common areas of apartment houses
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Heitman v. State, 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 160 (1991)
769 S.W.2d 887, 897 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), overruled on other grounds, Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681
The opinion
CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Anent point of error four, the opinion of the Court is anticlimatic: In Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), *909 a majority finally managed “to stay in step with the federal constitutional model for probable cause determinations,” id., at 164 . For the reasons developed in my dissenting opinion in that cause, id., at 166 ff, and also in my concurring opinion in Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 , 799 ff, such close order is a drill repugnant to our forebear-ers.
To yet another assault on the sovereignty of this State, I dissent.