Ford Motor Company v. Pace

On Petition to Rehear

Burhett, Justice.

There has been presented to us a petition to rehear herein by the Ford Motor Company, which is in effect rather undignified and pedagogical. Regardless of this fact, we have given the petition very careful and thorough consideration.

The petition basically is filed because our decision “makes it imperative as a condition for review by the Supreme Court of the United States, for the Court to either act or refuse to act upon the validity of the legislation under the Constitution of the United States, both with reference to the previous insistence and contentions by your Petitioner * # *”

The insistences then made are that the Act is void because it is contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; that as construed and applied by this Court it is void and contrary to the Constitution of the United States and more particularly to Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States, in that as we have construed the Act it constitutes a bill of attainder, is an ex post facto law, and a law *582 which, impairs the obligations of contracts, entered into and existing prior to the passage of the legislation. We are nnable to perceive these infirmities.

We in the original opinion have amply responded to the insistence that the Act is void because contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. There are no new authorities cited, and the petition merely cites cases and refers to the original brief which we considered very thoroughly by reading at least twice.

The other insistence is that it violates Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of the United States in that it “impairs the obligations of contracts and is an ex post facto law * * *” In Willys Motors, Inc. v. Northwest Kaiser-Willys, Inc., cited in our original opinion, that court held that a Minnesota statute making it unlawful for any motor vehicle manufacturer to cancel the franchise of retail dealer without just cause was a valid exercise of the state police power and was not repugnant to Article I, Section 10, of the United States Constitution. That court cited in support of its holding Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 , 26 S.Ct. 127, 130, 50 , L.Ed. 274, and a host of other cases. Insofar as it is applicable (we consider it an absolute answer to the question here made) the court has this to say:

“It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the state from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. This power, *583 which, in its various ramifications, is known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals. Familiar instances of this are where parties enter into contracts, perfectly lawful at the time, to sell liquor, operate a brewery or distillery, or carry on a lottery, all of which are subject to impairment by a change of policy on the part of the state, prohibiting the establishment or continuance of such traffic; in other words, that parties, by entering into contracts, may not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good.”

In our original opinion for reasons which we think are valid, we held that the enactment of the statute herein was within the power of the Legislature under its police power to enact. We cited various cases in support of our holding. There were none so far as we could find, or have been cited by able counsel, holding that it is not within the police power of the Legislature to pass such legislation as this.

We have carefully considered the entire matter and for the reasons expressed must overrule the petition to rehear.