holding that county public defender office proximately caused a violation of the plaintiff’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from court fees due to indigency when the public defender office failed to move for an indigency hearing, even though municipal judge had final authority over the decision
How later courts described this case
- holding that county public defender office proximately caused a violation of the plaintiff’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from court fees due to indigency when the public defender office failed to move for an indigency hearing, even though municipal judge had final authority over the decision
- stating that in order to succeed on a municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must establish that his or her constitutional rights were violated and that a policy or custom of the municipality was the “moving force” behind the depri vation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights
- finding an exception to Heck’s favorable termination requirement where Plaintiff could not have obtained habeas review of his sentence under any circumstances because he was fined for misdemeanor reckless-driving and then imprisoned for at least one, but not more than thirty, days for his failure to pay the fine
- holding that the chain of causation in a § 1983 suit against a public defender for his failure to move for an indigency hearing was not broken by the judge's failure to hold such a hearing sua sponte
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
While I agree with much of the majority’s opinion, we part company on what it properly recognizes to be the' “thorny question” of causation, specifically proximate cause. Maj. Op. at 609. The Ohio Revised Code places the duty squarely upon the court to hold a hearing into a defendant’s financial resources before committing-him to a jail or workhouse for failure to pay a fine. Ohio Rev.Code- § 2947.14. 1 In a perfect world, defense *620 counsel should remind the court of its statutory obligation, particularly when it is in the best interest of his or her client. 2 However, simply because judges face lengthy and growing dockets does not excuse them from fulfilling a statutory duty, as the majority suggests. Nor may a court refrain from inquiring into an issue that has not been raised by the litigants when a statute commands it. This court, for instance, has an independent duty to examine the basis of its jurisdiction regardless of whether the parties have briefed the issue. Accordingly, it seems to me that the majority is in error when it concludes that the trial court’s breach of its duty does not sever the “chain of causation” between plaintiffs injury and defendant’s alleged wrongdoing. Maj. Op. at 610.
In eases of outright misrepresentation by defense counsel, I agree with the majority that an erroneous ruling on the part of the court would not serve as a superseding cause. That is not the case here, however. The majority states that “there is no dispute that the Public Defender did not present the municipal judge with any information about Power’s financial status.” Maj. Op. at 611. On the contrary, counsel informed the court that “Mr. Powers is homeless and can’t come up with any bond,” which put the court on notice that an indigency hearing was necessary if the court intended to confine Powers for nonpayment of his fine. 3 It is hard for me to fathom how counsel’s statement, as the majority would have it, “left the municipal judge with the misleading impression that Power’s financial circumstances did not need to be investigated prior to incarcerating him on the unpaid fine.” Maj. Op. at 611. In short, I find nothing in this record to support the majority’s conclusion that the Public Defender, not the court, proximately caused Power’s alleged constitutional injury.
I respectfully dissent.
. As the majority notes, there may be scenarios where requesting a hearing is not in the best interest of the client, Maj. Op. at 617, which may help to explain why the statutory scheme places the duty to inquire on the court.
. The fact that Powers was represented by the Public Defender in the first place likewise provided a clear signal to the court that his financial resources were limited.