“we must again reiterate that the instruction as stated in California Jury Instruction 2.90 ... is preferred and is the one that all courts in Idaho should use in a criminal case”
How later courts described this case
- “we must again reiterate that the instruction as stated in California Jury Instruction 2.90 ... is preferred and is the one that all courts in Idaho should use in a criminal case”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BISTLINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
On the one hand we have the Court holding that it was error for the trial court to refuse defendant’s instruction on reasonable doubt, the Court having in the year 1970 given that instruction the stamp of approval. On the other hand we have one member of the Court casting doubt on that instruction. There is much to what Justice Bakes writes. “Beyond a reasonable doubt” may well be sufficient without further explanation and attempts at further refinements to the definition may cause confusion where perhaps none existed.
However, I agree with Justice McFadden that the failure to give the approved instruction was not error, and the instruction which was given “is not so confusing, misleading or erroneous as to require a reversal.” I do not see any language contained in the refused instruction which, had that instruction been given, would have produced a different result.
It does seem that the question having been raised by Justice Bakes, some further discussion by the Court might have been in order. Frankly, as with Justice Bakes, I do hot see much in the California jury instruction to commend it. Sitting as the new member of a court which has allowed itself to become deeply involved in the making of rules, some of which I fear transcend into the substantive law, it seems that we could take time to delve .more deeply into the validity of the instruction now brought into question.
Criticism of the California instruction means little, however, unless it is constructive. Accordingly, I offer up for semantic dissection the following suggested instruction on reasonable doubt:
The law gives a defendant in a criminal action a presumption of innocence which presumption remains with the defendant throughout the trial. The law places upon the State the burden of proving the defendant guilty. This is not the burden of proving that the defendant is more likely guilty than innocent, but requires that the evidence presented prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Doubt is a word of common usage and needs no further definition. A reasonable doubt is simply a doubt which you would entertain because to you it is reasonable. If, however, to you the doubt is not reasonable, then you will not entertain it, but cast it out.
Beyond is equally a word of common usage. Hence you are simply instructed that the evidence presented must convince you at least beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. In reaching a verdict you should be mindful that “beyond a reasonable doubt” is the same quality of proof which you would want required were you a defendant charged with a crime.