stating that a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) "will not be sustained if the facts alleged and the inferences reasonably deducible from the pleadings would entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory of the case." (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- stating that a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) "will not be sustained if the facts alleged and the inferences reasonably deducible from the pleadings would entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory of the case." (emphasis added)
- stating this court, when considering a motion to dismiss a complaint, will construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and determine if the "facts alleged and the inferences reasonably deducible from the pleadings would entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory of the case"
- holding that when reviewing a circuit court's decision on a motion to dismiss, "the appellate tribunal applies the same standard of review that was implemented by the [circuit] court"
- noting qualifying a prosecutor’s immunity would “prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor’s duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system” (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SHULER, J.,
dissenting:
Because I believe this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Williams’ appeal, I respectfully dissent.
Williams filed the instant action on August 11, 1999, and Respondents subsequently filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion on May 25, 2000. On June 5, Williams filed a post-trial motion asking the court to vacate the dismissal, claiming it came “as a complete surprise” that “must have been a clerical oversight or mistake” in light of his outstanding motion to compel discovery. In a form order dated June 22, the trial court denied the motion. Williams served notice of this appeal on July 7, 2000.
Under our rules of appellate procedure, a party’s notice of appeal must be served within thirty days “after receipt of written notice of entry of the order or judgment.” Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR. However, when a party makes a timely motion for j.n.o.v., to alter or amend the judgment, or for a new trial, “the time for appeal for all parties shall be stayed and shall run from receipt of written notice of entry of the order granting or denying such motion.” Id.; see Canal Ins. Co. v. Caldwell, 338 S.C. 1 , 524 S.E.2d 416 (Ct.App.1999).
On the other hand, motions made pursuant to Rule 60, SCRCP do not affect the finality of the judgment under attack and thus do not toll the time for appeal. See Otten v. Otten, 287 S.C. 166 , 337 S.E.2d 207 (1985); Coward Hund Constr. Co., Inc. v. Ball Corp., 336 S.C. 1 , 518 S.E.2d 56 (Ct.App.1999); see also, James F. Flanagan, South Carolina Civil Procedure (2d ed.1996). Accordingly, because a Rule 60 motion does not have the tolling effect of other post-trial motions under Rules 50 and 59, SCRCP, the time for appeal “continues to run from the entry of the judgment” that the motion challenges. Coward Hund, 336 S.C. at 6 , 518 S.E.2d at 59 (quoting 12 James W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 59.11[4][b] (3d ed.1999)).
Although the title of Williams’ motion to vacate the trial court’s order cited both Rule 59 and Rule 60, the language and *252 substance of the motion indicate Williams sought relief pursuant to Rule 60(a) and (b)(1), SCRCP. In particular, the motion stated: “The Plaintiff is informed and reasonably believes this Court should vacate the dismissal Order due to the Plaintiffs outstanding Motion to compel the Defendants’ appearance for depositions, because the issuance of this Order must have been a clerical oversight or mistake by the court.” (emphasis added). Williams, therefore, did not ask the court to alter or amend the judgment based upon a legal' or factual error in its order; rather, he requested relief because his motion to compel discovery was still pending.
A fair reading of Williams’ motion to vacate clearly shows he relied solely on Rule 60 in averring the trial court committed a “mistake” in overlooking his outstanding motion to compel. In my view, as the body of the motion is squarely within the purview of Rule 60 only, we must treat it as such for purposes of this appeal regardless of' the titular reference to Rule 59. See Mickle v. Blackmon, 255 S.C. 136, 140 , 177 S.E.2d 548, 549 (1970) (treating motion based on its “substance and effect” as opposed to how it was styled by plaintiff); Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Mungo, 306 S.C. 22 , 26, 410 S.E.2d 18, 20 (Ct.App.1991) (stating that it is the substance of the relief sought that matters “regardless of the form in which the request for relief was framed”).
The trial court issued its order dismissing Williams’ suit on May 25, 2000 and Williams admits the post office forwarded the order to him on May 30. Since a motion under Rule 60, SCRCP does not toll the time for appeal, Williams was required to serve his notice of appeal no later than June 29, 2000. Williams, however, served notice of this appeal on July 7, 2000; as a result, his appeal is untimely. Because timely service of a notice of appeal is a prerequisite to jurisdiction, I would find this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Williams’ appeal and dismiss. See Canal, 338 S.C. at 5 , 524 S.E.2d at 418 (“Rule 203(b), SCACR, requires a party to serve his notice of appeal within thirty days after receiving written notice of the entry of a final order or judgment, and failure to do so divests this court of subject matter jurisdiction and results in dismissal of the appeal.”). 6
. Although Williams asserts he "timely” filed his notice of appeal on July 8, 2000, it is the service of an appellant’s notice of appeal that must *253 be timely. In any event, as the timeliness of an appeal involves a question of subject matter jurisdiction, it is the duty of this Court to ascertain that an appeal is timely regardless of the parties’ assertions.