holding that "[p]er curiam opinion have precedential value as an application of settled principles of law to facts necessarily differing from those at issue in signed opinions. The value of a per curiam opinion arises in part from the guidance such decisions can provide to the lower courts regarding the proper application of the syllabus points of law relied upon to reach decisions in those cases[,]” and "[a] per curiam opinion may be cited as support for a legal argument.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that "[p]er curiam opinion have precedential value as an application of settled principles of law to facts necessarily differing from those at issue in signed opinions. The value of a per curiam opinion arises in part from the guidance such decisions can provide to the lower courts regarding the proper application of the syllabus points of law relied upon to reach decisions in those cases[,]” and "[a] per curiam opinion may be cited as support for a legal argument.”
- holding that when new points of law are announced they are articulated in syllabus points
- holding that signed opinions will be used to announce new points of law
- noting "that the ‘value of any per curiam opinion ... is in large measure a function of the quality of the opinion’s legal reasoning].]’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by State of West Virginia v. Marcus Patrele McKinley, 234 W. Va. 143 (2014)
210 W. Va. 490 , 558 S.E.2d 290 (2001), overruled on other grounds by State v. McKinley, 234 W. Va. 143 , 764 S.E.2d 303
The opinion
STARCHER, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
(Filed Nov. 1, 2001)
I concur with that portion of the majority’s opinion which clarifies the application of per curiam opinions. A per curiam opinion is a vehicle whereby the Court applies existing, undisputed points of law to a particular set of facts — if the Court addresses a novel legal issue or otherwise intends to change the law, it will do so in a signed opinion, not a per curiam opinion.
The majority opinion has “cleared up” a matter that has for some time either been misunderstood or misstated by the Court with respect to how per curiam opinions are to be considered. The current language should be helpful to students of the law, lawyers, and judges, as well as other readers of our opinions from this time forward.
I dissent, however, to that portion of the majority’s opinion which rejects the retroactive application of Hamric v. Doe, 201 W.Va. 615 , 499 S.E.2d 619 (1997). As Justice McGraw indicated in his dissent in Dalton v. Doe, 208 W.Va. 319 , 540 S.E.2d 536 (2000) — a dissent in which I joined — Hamtic did not mark a significant departure from previously settled law. I firmly believe, as with other cases involving statutory interpretation, that Hamtic should have been applied retroactively by the circuit court in the instant ease.