Socony Vacuum Oil Company v. State

*386 SNELL, Justice

(dissenting in part).

I concur in Divisions I and II of the majority opinion and in reversal and remand. The amount paid by the condemnor to another condemnee in the same project does not represent a sale between a willing buyer and seller. Evidence thereof is not admissible. The fact that the amount paid does not reflect a voluntary sale draws a sharp line against admissibility. Such a line is easy to distinguish and easy to follow. It provides the line of demarcation between the court’s duty to determine admissibility and the jury’s duty to determine weight.

The holding in Division III of the majority opinion breaches the line and in my opinion goes too far. It proceeds from an entirely different premise. It places on the trial court the duty of weighing the evidence.

It is, of course, true that a trial judge always has the duty of determining relevancy and materiality of offered evidence. The value of a corner lot in the business district of Des Moines would in no way be relevant to the value of a corner lot in a small town. In the case at bar, however, the property that now may not be considered at all as a matter of law is on the opposite side of the same street and within a few blocks of the condemned property. It is used for the same purpose but outside the perimeter of the improvement project. It was sold by a willing seller to a willing buyer at private sale.

Public and even private improvements almost inevitably have some impact upon the desirability and value of nearby property. The impact may be good or bad, great or small. It is a question of degree and in my opinion a question for the jury.

The majority opinion specifically overrules Ranck v. City of Cedar Rapids, 134 Iowa 563 , 111 N.W. 1027 and Snouffer v. Chicago and North-Western Railway Company, 105 Iowa 681 , 75 N.W. 501 . The Ranck case is a thorough analysis of the problems involved in determining values in condemnation. I think what is said therein is still sound.

It should be kept in mind that the Ranck case considered and we are not considering admissibility and not weight or probative value of evidence. In Ranck, loc. cit. 568, loc. cit. 111 N.W. 1029 , this appears: “The cases * * * serve well to illustrate the marked tendency of the courts to liberality in the admission of proof of any and all facts having any legitimate tendency to aid the jury in arriving at the value of the property appropriated under power of eminent domain. * * * The owner * * * is entitled to display all the attractive and desirable features of such property which may tend to enhance its value in the market, and thus secure the highest obtainable compensation therefor.” I see nothing wrong with such reasoning.

On page 572, 111 N.W. on page 1031 in discussing the exact point now before us the court said:

“A witness on the part of the appellee was permitted to testify that the fact that a bridge was to be constructed across the river had the effect to increase the market value of real estate generally in the neighborhood embracing the property in question, and upon this ruling error is assigned. * * * we are disposed to hold the evidence admissible.” (loc. cit. 572 of 134 Iowa, loc. cit. 1031 of 111 N.W.)

There was similar testimony in the case before us.

There is no question as to the admissibility of such evidence. The question is how far such evidence should go in barring reference to comparable sales.

I have no quarrel with the general statements cited and quoted by the majority from Nichols on Eminent Domain, 27 Am. Jur.2d and the Lacey case from South *387 Dakota until those statements are viewed with sufficient elasticity to categorically bar evidence such as we have here. Those authorities proceed from the premises that “an important enhancement of value because of the building of the project” appears without question. (Emphasis added)

In the South Dakota case enhancement so appeared without dispute. The purchaser of the claimed comparable (he was a witness for condemnor) testified he would not have been interested in the property except for the interstate highway and he paid quite a premium “for that reason.” His interest in the area was generated by the proposed improvement.

We have no such situation here. Texaco Company had been in the area with a filling station. It was a good location on a busy intersection of main streets. The state appropriated the property. Texaco went cater-comer across the intersection and bought the property offered in this case as a comparable. It was a negotiated sale.

There was testimony, quoted by the majority, that the price paid by Texaco was high. The reasons therefor were fully explored and explained. The probative weight of the evidence of value was challenged and undoubtedly reduced by the explanations, but there was nothing misleading or confusing to the jury in its admission. The Texaco people lost their location. Apparently they wanted to stay on the same corner. To stay in business they paid what was necessary for a comparable location for a filling station. Appellees also lost a location on a good corner on the same street a few blocks away. For purposes of comparison of location values we should not say that it is reversible to let the jury hear the facts.

The witnesses speculated that Texaco paid a high price to get a monopoly. If such was the fact the enhanced value was an indirect rather than direct result of the Capitol Grounds Extension project. The evidence does not show that a filling station location on East Fourteenth and Grand was any better after the project was announced than it was before.

The enhancement, if there was such, was because of a hoped for but in no way guaranteed monopoly.

In my opinion these are all questions of degree and go to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence.

Where the situation is as clear as in the South Dakota case the evidence of a claimed comparable would not be relevant but where as here the facts are fully explored admissibility should be within the court’s discretion and the weight left to the judgment of the jury.

We have repeatedly and consistently held that much must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court in determining whether other properties and conditions surrounding sale thereof are sufficiently similar so evidence of such sales is admissible. Iowa Development Company v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 252 Iowa 978, 986 , 108 N.W.2d 487 ; Linge v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 260 Iowa 1226, 1240 , 150 N.W. 2d 642 and Crozier v. Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Company, Iowa, 165 N.W.2d 833, 834, 835 .

In Crozier there were similarities and differences. We said:

“We do not believe the trial court abused his discretion in allowing the sales prices of these farms into evidence. These tracts of land were sufficiently similar in size, use, location and character to the Crozier farm to make their sales prices substantive evidence of the value of the Crozier farm. It is true neither farm had a wilderness hog farrowing operation. This difference in the operation of the farms is a distinction which was properly pointed out by plaintiffs. However, this difference in operation goes to the weight and credibility of the sales as comparable rather than to their admissibility.” (Emphasis added)

*388 In Belle v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 256 Iowa 43 , 126 N.W.2d 311 , we said:

“There were situation differences including loss of access and the building of a new road through the middle of plaintiffs’ property so the per acre value of comparable land was of lessened probative value in determining the measure of damage. There was enough similarity in the properties, however, so that the admission of the evidence was within the discretion of the court. * * *

“The admissibility of the evidence is for the court. The extent of the comparability and the weight and credit to be given the evidence is then for the jury. * * *” (loc. cit. 47 and 48, loc. cit. 314 of 126 N.W.2d)

The same rule should apply here.

It would be very difficult to find sales of property exactly comparable in every respect. If and when there are some differences or difference of opinion as to comparability I think it would be proper for the court to instruct the jury to consider the evidence only to the extent of comparability.

The extent to which a sale price, because of the improvement, does not reflect comparability should be disregarded by the jury. This is in line with the provisions of Article I, Section 18, Constitution of Iowa quoted by the majority.

This constitutional provision has been recognized by our courts since its adoption in 1857 and has been referred to in reported cases for over 100 years. Benefits are not offset against damages. See Deaton v. County of Polk, 9 Iowa 594 . This has created no great problem. Trial courts have instructed juries that benefits should not be considered. Brooks v. Davenport & St. Paul Railroad Company, 37 Iowa 99 , Stoner v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 227 Iowa 115, 126 , 287 N.W. 269 .

This constitutional provision is a benefit to a condemnee. It prevents a reduction of his award by offsetting benefits. If the provision is adequately applied in computing damages to condemnees by a simple instruction the same provision might well be applied to comparables since adoption of the rule in the first Redfield opinion discussed by the majority.

That juries are perfectly competent to consider the weight to be given various matters of evidence is illustrated by the figures quoted by the majority in Division IV.

The sale to Texaco was at $7.45 per square foot. The sale by Texaco to the State (not a true comparable) was at $5.11 per square foot. The other comparables were sold for $4.00, $3.00 and $2.88 per square foot respectively.

In referring to the sale to Texaco plaintiff’s independent appraiser used it for comparison but did not claim the subject property was worth as much. He said, “I felt well maybe it is worth half of it at the least.” This did not include the value of improvements.

The jury award to plaintiff was a fraction of a cent over $3.00 per square foot. If there was any prejudice to the con-demnor it does not appear from these figures.

The holding of the majority creates difficult problems for a trial judge. The question should be one of weight and not admissibility. To determine weight and credit of testimony we have juries.

I think the overruling of Ranck and cases following the rule therein stated is an unnecessary restriction on our present and enlightened use of comparable sales as evidence of value.

GARFIELD, C. J„ and LARSON and LeGRAND, JJ., join in this dissent.