holding Caldwell claim waived because there was no objection
How later courts described this case
- holding Caldwell claim waived because there was no objection
- "[Alr-guments should be addressed to the jury as a body and the practice of addressing individual jurors by name during the argument should be condemned rather than approved."
- counsel may, in appropriate circumstances, choose to concede guilt in whole or part or not to present a defense
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Battle, 198 Cal. App. 4th 50 (2011)
Freeman is distinguishable because Barron was an aider and abettor, not the actual killer.
The opinion
MOSK, J.
—I concur in the judgment. I am also in general agreement with the majority opinion by Justice Arabian and with the concurring opinion by Justice George.
*526 I write separately for one purpose, and for one purpose alone.
For 15 years, the Legislature has had before it an invitation to prohibit trial courts from attempting to define proof beyond a reasonable doubt in their jury instructions in criminal cases. (See People v. Brigham (1979) 25 Cal.3d 283, 292-316 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 905 , 599 P.2d 100 ] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
The invitation was extended at that time because any purported instructional definition of reasonable doubt—including, and perhaps especially, that which is deemed standard—was seen to run a substantial risk of violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which, in the words of In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ], “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” (.People v. Brigham, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 293 (cone. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
The risk of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause is even more substantial today. Indeed, it may now be characterized as grave. (See generally, Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. _ [ 127 L.Ed.2d 583 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 ].)
During the past 15 years, however, the Legislature has not acted. It shows no sign of acting now. Against its omission, we should take steps. In so doing, we would not trench on the legislative sphere. We would merely carry out our paramount obligation to enforce the United States Constitution, which is of course “the supreme law of the land” (Cal. Const., art. Ill, § 1). For we are required not only to remedy federal constitutional violations committed in the past, but also to prevent similar violations arising in the future.
Therefore, under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, I would henceforth prohibit trial courts from attempting any instructional definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.