stating “we cannot accept GM’s insinuation that ordinary consumers lack any legitimate expectations about the minimum safety of the products they use. In particular circumstances, a product’s design may perform so unsafely that the defect is apparent to the common reason, experience, and understanding of its ordinary consumers.”
How later courts described this case
- stating “we cannot accept GM’s insinuation that ordinary consumers lack any legitimate expectations about the minimum safety of the products they use. In particular circumstances, a product’s design may perform so unsafely that the defect is apparent to the common reason, experience, and understanding of its ordinary consumers.”
- reasoning that, under California law, plaintiffs may recover if they establish a product either falls below consumer expectation as to safety or, if it meets ordinary consumer expectations, the fact-finder determines the product's design yields excessive preventable danger
- refining Barker test and holding that the “consumer expectations test is reserved for cases in which the everyday -6- experience of the product’s users permits a conclusion that the product’s design violated minimum safety assumptions,” (emphases omitted) but that “the risks and benefits of a challenged design must be carefully balanced whenever the issue of design defect goes beyond the common experience of the product’s users”
- refining Barker test and holding that the "consumer expectations test is reserved for cases in which the everyday experience of the product's users permits a conclusion that the product's design violated minimum safety assumptions," (emphases omitted) but that "the risks and benefits of a challenged design must be carefully balanced whenever the issue of design defect goes beyond the common experience of the product's users"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ARABIAN, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s holding that the trial court committed instructional error in two respects, incorrectly charging the jury on the “consumer expectations” component of design defect liability, and improperly refusing defendant General Motors’ requested instruction on legal causation. I cannot agree, however, with the conclusion that the latter error was harmless.
“It is hornbook law that each party to a lawsuit is entitled to have the jury instructed on all of his theories of the case that are supported by the pleadings and the evidence. It is incumbent upon the trial court to instruct on all vital issues involved.” (Phillips v. G. L. Truman Excavation Co. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 801, 806 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 401 , 362 P.2d 33 ].) Furthermore, a trial court may not compel a litigant to rely on “abstract generalities in presenting its legal theory of the case to the jury, but should instruct the jury on vital issues in terms that relate to the particular case before it.” (Self v. General Motors *584 Corp. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 575 ]; see also Hasson v. Ford Motor Co. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 530, 543 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 705 , 564 P.2d 857 , 99 A.L.R.3d 158 ]; Borenkraut v. Whitten (1961) 56 Cal.2d 538, 545-546 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 635 , 364 P.2d 467 ]; Phillips v. G. L. Truman Excavation Co., supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 806 .)
The trial court here refused General Motors’ requested instruction on one of its two primary defense theories, to wit, that any design defect could not have been a “substantial” or “contributing” cause of plaintiff’s “enhanced” injuries if they would have occurred even with a nondefective design. 1 The proposed instruction, as the majority concede, was correct in form and substance. If the force of the collision was so severe that plaintiff’s injuries would have occurred notwithstanding any abstract “defect” in the vehicle’s safety design, the defect cannot be considered a substantial factor or legal cause in bringing them about. (See Doupnik v. General Motors Corp. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 849, 862-864 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 715 ]; Self v. General Motors Corp., supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 10 .)
As the majority further acknowledge, the proposed instruction encapsulated a “major thrust” of the defense theory at trial. General Motors presented substantial evidence that the force of the collision was the sole cause of plaintiff’s injuries, wholly apart from the existence of any defect. Its expert testified extensively in support of this theory, supporting his opinion with references to crash tests and voluminous documentation, and applying the data to the particular circumstances of the collision between plaintiff and the other driver. Thus, the proposed instruction set forth a correct statement of law and was amply supported by the evidence at trial. The trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury pursuant to its terms was plainly errroneous.
Was the error prejudicial? Viewed in the light of the relevant prejudicial-error standard and the pertinent analytical factors, I must conclude that it was. When the jury receives an improper instruction in a civil case, prejudice will be found “ ‘[w]here it seems probable that the jury’s verdict may have been based on the erroneous instruction . . . .’ ” (LeMons v. Regents of University of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 869, 875 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 355 , 582 P.2d 946 ], quoting Robinson v. Cable (1961) 55 Cal.2d 425, 428 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 359 P.2d 929 ].) In assessing that probability, we look to several factors, including the degree of conflict in the evidence, counsel’s *585 arguments, the effect of other instructions, and any indication from the jury that it was confused or misled. (Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069-1070 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 528 , 728 P.2d 1163 ].)
With respect to the potentially mitigating effect of other instructions, the standard definition of “legal cause” which the trial court read the jury plainly did not represent an adequate substitute for the requested pinpoint instruction. As the majority concede, the general instruction dealt only by “negative implication” (Self v. General Motors Corp., supra, 42 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 ) with General Motors’ theory that any defect could not have been a substantial factor because the injuries would have occurred in any event. “A trial court should not require a party to rely on abstract generalities in presenting its legal theory of the case to the jury, but should instruct the jury on vital issues in terms that relate to the particular case before it.” (Self v. General Motors Corp., supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 10 , italics added; see also Borenkraut v. Whitten, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 545 .) That is precisely what failed to occur here. The abstract definition of “legal cause”—“difficult conceptual problem for jurors—and for trial judges and appellate judges, too, for that matter” (Self v. General Motors Corp., supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 10 )—provided the jury no meaningful guidance in terms related to the particular case before it. Received in a factual vacuum and untethered to the specific causation theory proffered by General Motors, the general causation instruction failed to provide the tailored nexus between facts and law to which General Motors was entitled, and which the jury manifestly required. Hence, I am compelled to conclude that this factor weighs strongly in favor of a finding of prejudice.
The record evidence lends additional weight to this conclusion. The majority note that General Motors produced “voluminous evidence” to demonstrate that the force of the accident was so severe that plaintiff’s injuries would have occurred regardless of any defect. We are apparently to infer, therefore, that the jury was adequately apprised—based on the evidence—of the law and logic underlying General Motors’ theory of defense. I would suggest that the more reasonable inference is precisely the opposite. Given the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence adduced at trial, the jury was all the more in need of a clear and unambigous instruction to integrate and make sense of the conflicting evidence. Therefore, I must conclude that this factor as well supports a finding of prejudice.
The majority note that counsel for General Motors explained its causation theory to the jury during closing argument. Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, however, I do not find that this represented an adequate substitute for a proper legal instruction. Juries are generally instructed, as they were *586 here, that “the court’s instructions . . . instruct you as to the applicable law,” and that “statements of counsel are not evidence” but merely the statements of advocates. Thus, although pertinent to the prejudice calculation, the arguments of counsel “are not to be judged as having the same force as an instruction from the court.” (Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 384-385 [ 108 L.Ed.2d 316, 331-332 , 110 S.Ct. 1190 ].)
Counsel’s argument was merely that—argument—unless and until a ratifying instruction from the trial court dignified it with the force of law. As the United States Supreme Court has well observed, “It is obvious that under any system of jury trials the influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight, and that his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove controlling.” (Starr v. United States (1894) 153 U.S. 614, 626 [ 38 L.Ed. 841, 846 , 14 S.Ct. 919 ], quoted with approval in Sanguinetti v. Moore Dry Dock Co. (1951) 36 Cal.2d 812, 819 [ 228 P.2d 55 ].) The omission of a critical charge may, of course, prove to be just as instrumental to the outcome. Thus, I am not prepared to say that the trial court’s refusal to instruct on a theory at the heart of the defense, in terms pertinent to the circumstances of the case, was rendered harmless as a result of counsel’s argument.
In view of these findings, it appears to me at the very least reasonably “probable” that the jury’s verdict may have been based on the erroneous refusal to instruct on a critical theory of the defense. (LeMons v. Regents of University of California, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 875 .) Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
The requested instruction was as follows: “If you find that the subject Camaro vehicle was improperly designed, but you also find that Terri Soule would have received enhanced injuries even if the design had been proper, then you must find that the design was not a substantial factor in bringing about her injuries and therefore was not a contributing cause thereto.”