The opinion
Judge Greene
concurring.
I agree with the majority that entry of judgment in this case occurred when the trial judge signed the judgment on 30 April 1990, and that petitioner’s notice of appeal is, therefore, timely. I write separately to make clear that entry of judgment does not necessarily occur when the trial judge signs the proposed judgment.
When judgment is rendered in open court, and no findings of fact and conclusions of law are required, entry of judgment occurs under paragraphs one and two of Rule 58 provided the requirements of those particular paragraphs are met.
When judgment is not rendered in open court, entry of judgment occurs under paragraph three of Rule 58 when the order is signed by the judge, delivered to the clerk of the superior court, filed by the clerk, and the clerk mails a notice of filing to all parties.
When (1) judgment is rendered in open court and findings of fact and conclusions of law are required, or (2) judgment is rendered in open court and no findings of fact or conclusions of law are required but there is a failure to comply with paragraphs one or two of Rule 58, or (3) when judgment is not rendered in open court but there is a failure to comply with paragraph three of Rule 58, then entry of judgment “occurs only after draft orders or judgments are submitted to and adopted by the court,” and upon notice of entry to all other parties. Stachlowski v. Stack, 328 N.C. 276, 283 , 401 S.E.2d 638, 643 (1991). Therefore, entry of judgment cannot occur before the judgment is signed by the *686 court. However, entry does not occur until all the parties have notice that the judgment has been signed by the trial judge. Stachlowski at 287 , 401 S.E.2d at 645 (relevant factor in determining entry is whether the party had fair notice of the court’s judgment). The burden is on the party claiming the appeal to be untimely to show the date on which notice was received by all parties. This burden can be met and entry deemed complete when the signed judgment is filed with the clerk and the clerk mails notice of its filing to all parties. Cf. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 58 (similar provision giving rise to entry of judgment for judgments not rendered in open court). In the absence of any evidence of actual notice or a mailing by the clerk, a party filing notice of appeal within thirty days of the signing of the judgment is deemed to have received notice of the signing of the judgment, and entry is deemed to have occurred on the date of the signing of the judgment.
In the present case, the order was rendered in open court and findings of fact and conclusions of law, though made, were not required. See Overton v. Goldsboro City Board of Education, 304 N.C. 312, 316 , 283 S.E.2d 495, 498 (1981) (applicable standard of review for appeal from local board of education to court is found under N.C.G.S. § 150A-51, now recodified under § 150B-51); Faulkner v. North Carolina State Hearing Aid Dealers and Fitters Bd., 38 N.C. App. 222, 225 , 247 S.E.2d 668, 670 (1978) (findings of fact not required in judicial review under N.C.G.S. § 150A-51, now recodified under § 150B-51). Therefore, entry would normally occur under paragraphs one or two of Rule 58 in this situation. However, by directing respondent’s counsel to prepare an order, the trial judge gave a “contrary direction” precluding entry under paragraph one. Stachlowski at 280 , 401 S.E.2d at 641 . Paragraph two is inapplicable because the trial judge did not direct the clerk to make a notation in the minutes. Therefore, entry occurred after the trial judge signed the order and fair notice of the signing of the order was given to all parties.
The trial judge signed the order on 30 April 1990, and notice of appeal was filed on 17 May 1990. Even though there is no affirmative evidence of notice, the appeal was made within thirty days after the order was signed and all parties are, therefore, deemed to have received notice of the execution of the order by the trial judge on the day of its execution and the order is deemed to have been entered at that time.