State v. Locklear

Justice MARTIN

dissenting.

The trial court instructed the jury that: (1) only two sentencing options were available — death and life without parole; and (2) a find *468 ing of mental retardation would eliminate death as an option. Having received these instructions, the jury was fully aware that a finding of mental retardation would mandate a sentence of life without parole.

The execution of mentally retarded defendants violates the United States Constitution,. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002), and state law, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(b) (2007). For this reason, the trial court in a capital case must observe procedural protections designed to meet the challenges associated with identifying such defendants. The narrow issue here, however, is whether the jury in this case understood the consequences of a finding that defendant was mentally retarded.

When a defendant claims that an instruction is ambiguous and subject to erroneous interpretation, “the proper inquiry ... is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.” Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990). A “reasonable likelihood” is more than a “possibility.” See id. “[T]he proper inquiry is not whether the instruction ‘could have’ been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did so apply it.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6 (1994) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 , 72 & n.4 (1991)); see also State v. Smith, 360 N.C. 341, 347 , 626 S.E.2d 258, 261-62 (2006) (applying reasonable likelihood test to challenged jury instruction).

Moreover, the challenged instruction “ ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge,’ ” Boyde, 494 U.S. at 378 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)), and the proceedings generally, see id. at 381. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court has explained that “[j]urors do not sit in solitary isolation booths parsing instructions for subtle shades of meaning” but rather “[differences among them in interpretation of instructions may be thrashed out in the deliberative process, with commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial likely to prevail over technical hairsplitting.” Id. at 380-81.

This Court recently stated that, in reviewing jury instructions allegedly subject to erroneous interpretation, “we inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution.... In determining whether the defendant has met the reasonable likelihood *469 standard this Court must review the trial court’s instruction to the jury in the context of the overall charge.” Smith, 360 N.C. at 347 , 626 S.E.2d at 261-62 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The trial court here opened the sentencing proceeding by instructing the jury that its sole purpose was to determine which of two sentences, death or life without parole, defendant would receive: “Members of the jury, having found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, it is now your duty to recommend to the Court whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without parole.” At no time during the sentencing proceeding was the jury advised of any potential third form of punishment, nor was the jury advised that, the defendant having been found guilty of first-degree murder, he nevertheless might be released.

“[J]urors are presumed to pay close attention to the particular language of the judge’s instructions in a criminal case ... and [to] follow the instructions as given.” State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 455 , 509 S.E.2d 178, 196 (1998) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835 (1999). This presumption is particularly appropriate here, as the trial court’s instruction was the first sentence spoken to the jury on the first day of the sentencing proceeding. As this Court recently observed: “The trial court alluded to only two possible sentences, death or life imprisonment without parole. Therefore, if the jury followed these instructions, they knew of only these two possible sentences. We must presume that the jury followed these instructions.” State v. Smith, 359 N.C. 199, 219 , 607 S.E.2d 607, 622 , cert. denied, 546 U.S. 850 (2005).

Following presentation of mental retardation and other sentencing evidence, the trial court gave the instruction now challenged on appeal. The instruction, which tracked both state statutory law, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(b), and the pattern jury instruction, 1 N.C.P.I.— Crim. 150.05 (2001), read: “The law provides that no defendant who is mentally retarded shall be sentenced to death. The one issue for you to determine at this stage of the proceedings reads: Is the defendant, Dane Locklear, Jr., mentally retarded?” Having been told that its two sentencing options were death and life without parole and that a finding of mental retardation would foreclose a death sentence, the jury could reach only one reasonable conclusion: a finding of mental retardation would result in a sentence of life without parole.

That the jury understood the consequences of a finding of mental retardation is supported not only by “the context of the overall *470 charge,” Boyde, 494 U.S. at 378 , but also by “all that [took] place at the trial,” id. at 381 . During closing arguments on mental retardation, counsel for both parties specifically informed the jury that a finding of mental retardation would result in a sentence of life without parole. The prosecutor stated, “If Dane Locklear can prove that he is mentally retarded, then as a matter of law, he cannot be sentenced to death. And if you’ve been convicted of first degree murder, as he has been in this case, he has to be sentenced to life in prison without parole.” Similarly, defense counsel stated, “If we show . . . that he’s retarded, it’s a life sentence without parole.” These arguments corroborated the trial court’s instructions and weigh against a conclusion that the jury’s verdict was influenced by an erroneous understanding of the law. See Middleton v. McNeil, 541. U.S. 433, 438 (2004) (per curiam) (explaining that a state court is not precluded “from assuming that counsel’s arguments clarified an ambiguous jury charge” and that “[t]his assumption is particularly apt when it is the prosecutor’s argument that resolves an ambiguity in favor of the defendant”).

Read in total isolation, the challenged instruction did not rule out the possibility that a mentally retarded defendant might receive punishment other than life without parole. But the jurors did not hear the instruction in isolation. Instead, they heard the instruction in the context of a capital sentencing proceeding that the trial court had told them would result in a recommendation of either death or life without parole. It would defy “commonsense understanding,” Boyde, 494 U.S. at 381 , for the jury to speculate that the trial court would postpone the determination of mental retardation to the middle of a proceeding about death versus life imprisonment if a finding of mental retardation would make defendant eligible for some third result. This is especially true when, as in this case, both parties’ counsel told the jury otherwise.

The majority compares the instant case with this Court’s decision in State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1 , 224 S.E.2d 595 (1976). The majority concludes that here, as there, the trial court’s instructions left the jury uninformed about the consequences of its verdict and prone to speculate that defendant would be released to the community should it find him mentally retarded. See id. at 15 , 224 S.E.2d at 603-04 . Hammonds is distinguishable from the instant case in two significant respects. First and foremost, the jury in Hammonds was never told the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. at 11 , 224 S.E.2d at 601 . Because defendants who are found not guilty *471 generally go free, the trial court’s failure to inform the jury of the statutory commitment procedure may well have left the impression that an acquittal by reason of insanity would result in the release of a potentially dangerous defendant. Id. at 13 , 224 S.E.2d at 602 . Here, on the other hand, the jury had already found defendant guilty of first-degree murder when it was asked to determine whether he was mentally retarded. Because defendants who are found guilty of murder generally do not go free, and because the trial court’s instructions as a whole limited the punishment for a mentally retarded defendant guilty of first-degree murder to life without parole, there was no rational basis for the jury to speculate that defendant would receive anything other than a life sentence.

Additionally, this Court noted in Hammonds that the jury was further confused by the prosecutor’s misleading statement in closing argument that “ ‘if you conclude [the defendant] is not guilty [by reason of insanity], ... he walks out of this courtroom not guilty, returned to this community.’ ” Id. at 11 , 224 S.E.2d at 601 . Here, in contrast, counsel for both parties corroborated the trial court’s instructions by correctly informing the jury that a finding of mental retardation would result in a sentence of life without parole. Put simply, the concerns raised in Hammonds are not implicated here, and defendant has not shown a reasonable possibility that his requested instruction would have led to a different result at his sentencing proceeding. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (2007).

“[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (citations omitted). “[N]ot every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level of a due process violation,” McNeil, 541 U.S. at 437, and resentencing is improper “where the claimed error amounts to no more than speculation,” Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380 . Here, the challenged instruction did not confuse the jury or lead it to disregard “constitutionally relevant evidence” of mental retardation. Id. Accordingly, the trial court’s instruction on mental retardation does not entitle defendant to a new sentencing proceeding. 1

I respectfully dissent.

. While the trial court’s instruction does not entitle defendant to a new sentencing proceeding, the Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions may nevertheless wish to consider additional language stating that a finding of mental retardation will result in a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. See State v. Benton, 299 N.C. 16, 22 , 260 S.E.2d 917, 921 (1980) (stating that when a challenged pattern instruction “cor *472 rectly declared the law” and, when read in context with the entire charge to the jury, “was not so confusing as to mislead the jury or affect the verdict,” the defendant was not entitled to a new trial, but suggesting that the instruction “might be reviewed by the Committee . . . for possible clarification”).