finding decisions denying coverage despite existence of severability clause more persuasive because each decision "considers and gives effect to all the policy provisions and recognizes that an insurance policy is a contract between the parties which should be enforced in a manner consistent with the intentions expressed therein"
How later courts described this case
- finding decisions denying coverage despite existence of severability clause more persuasive because each decision "considers and gives effect to all the policy provisions and recognizes that an insurance policy is a contract between the parties which should be enforced in a manner consistent with the intentions expressed therein"
- holding that the phrase “any insured” in an exclusion “unambiguously expresse[d] a contractual intent to create joint obligations and to prohibit recovery by an innocent co-insured” and rejecting the argument that this interpretation rendered a separation of insureds clause meaningless
- holding exclusion for damage “ ‘expected or intended by any insured’ clearly and unambiguously expresses an intention to deny coverage to all insureds when damage is intended or expected as a result of the actions of any insured,” notwithstanding severability clause
- holding that an exclusion for the intentional acts of “any insured” precluded a negligent supervision claim despite a severability clause
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice ERICKSON
specially concurring in the result:
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the intentional act exclusion bars liability coverage of the Chacons for the intentional acts of their child when the damages are in excess of the supplemental policy limit of $250. 1 In addition, I agree with the dissent's conclusion that the sever-ability clause creates separate insurable interests in each of the insureds. By writing separately, I intend to emphasize that, despite the severability clause, the exclusion expresses a clear intent to preclude coverage for liability on the part of an insured for the intentional acts of the other individual insureds. Spezialetti v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 759 F.2d 1189, 1141-42 (3rd Cir.1985); McCauley v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 716 F.Supp. 718, 721 (D.Conn.1989). The language of the intentional act exclusion unambiguously expresses the intent to render the severability clause inapplicable to liability of one insured under the policy for the intentional acts of another insured. McCauley, 716 F.Supp. at 721 .
In Arenson v. National Auto. and Cas. Ins. Co., 45 Cal.2d 81 , 286 P.2d 816 (1955), the intentional act exclusion stated that “[tjhis policy does not apply ... to injury, sickness disease, death or destruction caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured...” 45 Cal.2d at 82-83 , 286 P.2d at 817 . The court in Arenson *753 held that the policy in that case did not exclude coverage for liability based on the intentional acts of a co-insured. Id. at 83-84 , 286 P.2d at 818 . The use of the word “any” in the Chacons’ homeowner policy dictates a different result than that reached in Arenson. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 432 Mich. 656, 691-93 , 443 N.W.2d 734, 751-52 (1989).
. The supplemental policy provides coverage to the Chacons for intentional acts of an insured child under the age of thirteen to the extent of $250.