Opinion

People v. Cook

  • 22 Cal. 3d 67
  • 148 Cal. Rptr. 605
  • 583 P.2d 130
  • 1978 Cal. LEXIS 277
Court
California Supreme Court
Filed
Sep 8, 1978
Status
Published
Author
Richardson
On the bench
Mosk, Richardson, Clark
Cited by
128 cases

affirming Theodor on state constitutional grounds

How later courts described this case

  • affirming Theodor on state constitutional grounds

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

RICHARDSON, J.

I concur in the judgment. Substantial, material mis truths of the nature herein alleged justify the quashing of the search warrant without regard to whether the remaining allegations contained in the affidavit are sufficient to demonstrate probable cause.

However, I do not believe that every intentional misstatement in an affidavit should so fatally infect the remaining allegations as to render invalid the search warrant in its entirety. No deliberate falsehoods can ever be condoned, but where they occur in the law enforcement process and pertain to insubstantial, immaterial, or wholly collateral matters and do not raise reasonable doubt as to the truth of the remainder of the affiant’s assertions, I would not punish the People by invalidating the warrant; rather, I would leave to criminal sanction or to appropriate internal law enforcement administration the necessary discipline for those who have intentionally falsified.

By way of illustration, in the present case Detective Gregory’s affidavit recited that rental manager Smith told Gregory that he went to defendant’s house to evict him for nonpayment of rent. Defendant’s investigator, West, interviewed Smith, however, and was told that Smith went to defendant’s house to collect past due rent. Assuming for purpose of argument that Gregory for some unknown reason intentionally misstated the facts in this regard, no one has suggested that such misrepresentation should void the warrant. The majority opinion, nevertheless, indicates that every intentional mistruth would so operate, regardless of the materiality on the issue of probable cause. (See ante, p. 89.)

In my view this position is too extreme. I would forego application of such a strict per se treatment in favor of a rule of reason, at least as to mistruths regarding collateral matters which are not pertinent to the issue of probable cause.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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