explaining that when the right to an impartial jury has been violated, “no inquiry as to the sufficiency of the evidence to show guilt is indulged and a conviction by a jury so selected must be set aside”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that when the right to an impartial jury has been violated, “no inquiry as to the sufficiency of the evidence to show guilt is indulged and a conviction by a jury so selected must be set aside”
- recognizing that members of a constitutionally protected group are “[c]ertainly . . . subject to challenges for cause and peremptory challenges on grounds of specific bias”
- explaining that a party who suspects his opponent is striking potential jurors based on group bias ''should make as complete a record of the circumstances as is feasible”
- explaining that a party can make a prima facie case by “showing] that his opponent has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part by Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005)
22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler), overruled in part in Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162
Overruled in part by People v. Willis, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301 (2002)
22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748, 761 (1978), overruled in part by People v. Willis, 27 Cal.4th 811, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 43 P.3d 130 (2002)).
Overruled on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
22 Cal. 3d 258 (Cal. 1978), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. California, 545 6 U.S. 162 (2005), and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
Criticized by Mallott v. State, 1980 Alas. LEXIS 515 (1980)
The rationale of Wheeler, reliance on the representative cross section rule, has been criticized as being itself based on group stereotypes:
Declined to follow by May v. State, 1986 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 5883 (1986)
We refuse to adopt a Wheeler -type approach as suggested by appellant, and adhere to Swain’s holding that a defendant is not entitled to a new trial unless and until he is able to produce sufficient proof of systematic exclusion of an identifiable group over an extended period of time.
Declined to follow by People v. Lewis, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588 (2008)
) We decline to extend Batson and Wheeler beyond their current parameters.
The opinion
BIRD, C. J., Concurring.
I agree with the result reached by the majority that the state’s use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of race violates the right to trial by jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. I do not believe that the state can systematically exclude blacks from serving on a jury by the selective use of the peremptory challenge by the state’s representative, i.e., the prosecutor. However, I do not concur in the dicta in the majority opinion which suggest other restrictions on the use of peremptory challenges. The peremptory challenge is not a challenge for cause. The distinction between the two should not be blurred in our attempt to stop an unconstitutional practice.