explaining that the narrative portion of a police report “does not have the reliability inherent in other documents that courts have traditionally considered to be business records,” and concluding that “the narratives contained in police reports generated in connection with police investigations are not the appropriate subject of an exception to the hearsay rule.”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the narrative portion of a police report “does not have the reliability inherent in other documents that courts have traditionally considered to be business records,” and concluding that “the narratives contained in police reports generated in connection with police investigations are not the appropriate subject of an exception to the hearsay rule.”
- ruling that “[t]he only evidence linking appellant to the [prior crime of possession of crack cocaine] was a certified conviction, which is insufficient, standing alone, to establish the required nexus” for similar transaction evidence
- concluding that the trial court erred in allowing âa police officer to read into evidence the narrative portion of a police report of which he had no personal knowledge and did not prepareâ
- finding narrative portion of police report not admissible as a business record because narrative may contain opinion and reflect “human attitudes and emotions which are subjective in nature and susceptible to many interpretations”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Carley, Justice,
concurring.
I agree that the business records exception to the hearsay rule *38 does not apply to the narrative portion of the police report at issue, and that the Court of Appeals erroneously affirmed the trial court’s admission of other hearsay testimony as relevant to explain the conduct of a police officer. I also acknowledge that the majority has expressly held that it does not “address the admissibility of other information not contained in the narrative of the police report.” However, because I believe that certain portions of police reports can be admissible in criminal cases, I take this opportunity to reflect upon holdings of other jurisdictions with regard to this issue. Also, because 1 cannot agree with the majority’s characterization of police work as “adversarial” and “inherently accusatorial,” I concur only in Division 2 and in the judgment of reversal.
The mere “fact that their preparation was incidental to a police [investigation] does not make them inadmissible ([cits.]).” People v. Guidice, 634 NE2d 951, 953 (N.Y. 1994). The courts of this state have correctly presumed the honesty, integrity, and reliability of law enforcement officers. Whitlock v. State, 230 Ga. 700, 705 (4) ( 198 SE2d 865 ) (1973); Williams v. State, 239 Ga. App. 671, 672 ( 522 SE2d 43 ) (1999). The exclusion of certain police reports as hearsay is not properly based upon exaggerated deficiencies of police investigations, such as those set forth by the majority, but rather on the right of the accused, with respect to a report which is prepared partly in contemplation of prosecution, to cross-examine the author regarding the motivation and accuracy of his perception and recall, the manner of language usage, and the soundness of his conclusions. State v. Bertul, 664 P2d 1181, 1185 (Utah 1983) (cited in footnote 3 of the majority opinion).
Most courts have refused to apply Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109 (63 SC 477, 87 LE 645) (1943) “to police reports proffered as business entries when the reports relate to ‘routine, nonadversarial matters’ such as the recordation of license plate or serial numbers.” 1 Imwinkelried, Giannelli, Gilligan & Lederer, Courtroom Criminal Evidence § 1220, p. 413 (3d ed. 1998). See also United States v. Brown, 9 F3d 907, 911-912 (II) (B) (11th Cir. 1993); People v. Guidice, supra at 953 ; Montgomery v. United States, 517 A2d 313, 316 (II) (D.C. 1986) (cited in footnote 3 of the majority opinion); State v. Best, 703 P2d 548, 550-551 (Ariz. App. 1985); State v. Bertul, supra at 1184, 1185-1186 .
Many courts . . . have drawn a distinction between police records prepared in a routine, non-adversarial setting and those resulting from a more subjective investigation and evaluation of a crime. [Cits.] . . . “In the case of documents recording routine, objective observations, made as part of the everyday function of the preparing official or agency, the *39 factors likely to cloud the perception of an official engaged in the more traditional law enforcement functions of observation and investigation of crime are simply not present.
Decided July 2, 2001.
Lynn M. KLeinrock, for appellant.
J. Tom Morgan III, District Attorney, Robert M. Coker, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
United States v. Brown, supra at 911 (II) (B). “Merely identifying a person who was arrested is not subject to the dangers of inadequate perception, memory or narration, while reporting details of a criminal investigation is subject to such dangers.” State ex rel. Mack v. Purkett, 825 SW2d 851, 856 (Mo. 1992). Other examples of admissible police records of routine matters include the day a crime was reported, fingerprint records, and a form for police officers to document the condition of police vehicles and to provide a skeletal outline of each day’s activities. Montgomery v. United States, supra at 316 (II); State v. Bertul, supra at 1184 . Such police records serve an important administrative function, and their fixture use in litigation, although foreseeable, is not the sole purpose for their preparation. People v. Guidice, supra at 953 ; Montgomery v. United States, supra at 316 (II).
The police report in question here contains a detailed narrative concerning a prior undercover purchase of cocaine. Brown v. State, 245 Ga. App. 149, 151 (2) (c) ( 537 SE2d 421 ) (2000). Because that narrative is clearly not a routine, nonadversarial, or administrative matter, it is not admissible xxnder the business records exception. Therefore, the majority correctly reverses the Court of Appeals’ holding to the contrary.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice Hines join in this opinion.