holding that statute of limitations “unconstitutionally invade[d] the province of the supreme court’s rule-making authority” because it contradicted limitation period stated in Rules of Criminal Procedure
How later courts described this case
- holding that statute of limitations “unconstitutionally invade[d] the province of the supreme court’s rule-making authority” because it contradicted limitation period stated in Rules of Criminal Procedure
- holding a statutory one-year time limitation applying to filing petitions for post-conviction relief unconstitutional because the law conflicted with Rule 32
- statute must yield to court rule governing procedural matter
- right to post-conviction relief is substantive but time limits are procedural
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KLEINSCHMIDT, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result. I do not find the distinctions drawn by many of the cases cited by the majority between what is “procedural” and what is “substantive” to be very helpful. I tend to agree with the observation of the Colorado Supreme Court in Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 314-15 , 592 P.2d 792, 800-01 (1979), that a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another, depending on the underlying social policies of the competing rule of court and statute. Viewed this way, a very strong argument can be made *415 that the legislative policy of finality embodied in A.R.S. § 13-4234(F) ought to prevail in this case. Given cases like Daou v. Harris, 139 Ariz. 353 , 678 P.2d 934 (1984) (reasonable time limits are procedural), and the fact that the right to prescribe the rules of evidence, a field in which there is great room for fundamental policy considerations to operate, remains a province of the supreme court, I cannot say that the statutory one year limitation is substantive. Nor can I say that the statute is “reasonable and workable” in relation to the rule so that the two can co-exist. See State ex rel. Collins v. Siedel, 142 Ariz. 587 , 691 P.2d 678 (1984).