The opinion
Jordan, Presiding Judge,
dissenting. I agree with the dissent by Judge Evans as to Division 1 and further dissent from the *506 ruling made in Division 2 of the opinion. When a cáse is properly before this court for review on direct appeal, as is this one,, and a cross appeal is filed, the cross appellant “may present for adjudication on the cross appeal all errors or rulings adversely affecting him, and in no case shall the appellee be required to institute an independent appeal on his own right.”' Code Ann. § 6-803 (a). This to me in clear language expresses the intent of the legislature with respect to a cross appeal once’ a case is properly before the appellate court for review on direct appeal. This intent was in no way affected by the subsequent-amendments to the Appellate Practice Act and the Civil Practice-Act referred to in the majority opinion. In my view these-amendments deal only with the requirements for a direct appeal with respect to motions for summary judgment.
The majority opinion conflicts with the general intent of the-Appellate Practice Act -by disjointing and fracturing a case-thereby causing unnecessary delay in the process of appellate review. When a case is before this court on a proper enumeration of errors, the parties and the court below are entitled to a consideration of all orders and rulings which might affect the-trial and conduct of that case. To do otherwise is to require costly and fragmented appeals on issues which could properly be determined in the first instance.
Any holding in the Hood case, cited in the majority opinion, which would prevent a cross appellant from enumerating as error an adverse ruling on a motion for summary judgment should be-overruled.
It is noted that the main appeal in this case is from a ruling granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Count 1 of the petition. The trial judge certified the case for review under Code Ann. § 81A-156 (h) within 10 days. Such was not required for the direct appeal. If such certificate could be said to apply to that portion of his order overruling in part the-defendant’s motion as to Counts 2 and 3 of the petition, it is assumed that the holding in Hood, supra, would not be applicable. The certificate should be applicable to his entire order dealing with the motions for summary judgment.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Hall and *507 Judges Eberhardt and Whitman concur in this dissent as to Division 2 of the opinion.