concluding that testimony from expert witnesses in regard to “the consistencies between the victim’s behavior and the behavior of typical victims of child sexual abuse” was erroneous “[b]ecause the defendant never argued that the victim’s behavior was inconsistent with that of a typical victim . . .”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that testimony from expert witnesses in regard to “the consistencies between the victim’s behavior and the behavior of typical victims of child sexual abuse” was erroneous “[b]ecause the defendant never argued that the victim’s behavior was inconsistent with that of a typical victim . . .”
- holding that an expert generally “may not testify that the particular child victim’s behavior is consistent with that of a sexually abused child” because doing so “comes too close to testifying that the particular child is a victim of sexual abuse”
- describing two expert witnesses who testified for the prosecution about the veracity of victim allegations in child sex abuse cases: “Certainly neither witness stated that the child victim was telling the truth. However, the risk here goes beyond such a direct reference. Indeed, as we have cautioned before, the jury in these credibility contests is looking ‘to hang its hat’ on the testimony of witnesses it views as impartial. Such references to truthfulness as go beyond that which is allowed under MRE 702”
- reflecting the Michigan Supreme Court’s appreciation that the risks associated with expert vouching in child sexual assault cases are exacerbated by “the nature of the offense and the terrible consequences of a miscalculation” given that, “[t]o a jury recognizing the awesome dilemma of whom to believe, an expert will often represent the only seemingly objective source, offering it a much sought-after hook on which to hang its hat” (quoting People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 404 (Mich. 1990) (plurality))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Brickley, C.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the rationale of the majority opinion, and in the holding in People v Smith. I dissent from the holding in People v Peterson, because I do not agree that the error was harmless.