holding that in ineffective assistance of counsel context, “the failure of an attorney to remit his state bar dues is strong evidence that such attorney is no longer sufficiently interested in the practice of law to adequately defend his client’s interests”
How later courts described this case
- holding that in ineffective assistance of counsel context, “the failure of an attorney to remit his state bar dues is strong evidence that such attorney is no longer sufficiently interested in the practice of law to adequately defend his client’s interests”
- recognizing that “the failure of an attorney to remit his state bar dues is strong evidence that such attorney is no longer sufficiently interested in the practice of law to adequately defend his client’s interests”
- although recognizing that the alleged suspension of defendant’s attorney for failure to pay his bar dues did not make out a per se case of ineffective assistance of counsel, remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the allegations were correct and whether the defendant had received inadequate assistance of counsel due to “the implications, in terms of quality of representation, arising out of counsel’s having neglected to pay his annual dues”
- declined to adopt per se rule that right to counsel was violated because attorney had been suspended for failure to pay dues; remanded for factual determination of counsel's effectiveness
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Cynar, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the failure of defendant’s attorney to pay his bar dues does not make out a per se case of ineffective assistance of counsel.
However, I see no need for a remand in this case. My review of the trial record indicates that counsel did a fine job of representing defendant at *763 trial. He objected to evidence, cross-examined witnesses and did a capable job of presenting an intoxication defense. Not surprisingly, on appeal, defendant is unable to point to any specific conduct constituting ineffective assistance of counsel.
Under these circumstances I believe a remand is unnecessary. No violation of the standard set forth in. People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250 ; 247 NW2d 547 (1976), occurred here. Therefore, I would affirm.