The opinion
M. F. Cavanagh, P.J.,
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). To view this controversy in proper perspective, we must bear in mind that the provision which renders the basic right of referendum inapposite is itself an integral part of this state’s constitution. This Court has the duty to treat both provisions with equal deference. By the same token, the Legislature cannot, by the mere use of tie-bar language, abrogate either provision. We delude ourselves when we allow the use of sophistic phraseology to determine which constitutional provision controls in any given situation.
While I concur with the majority with respect to 1978 PA 426 , I dissent from their conclusion that 1978 PA 427 does not constitute an appropriation to a state institution and is therefore subject to referendum. After careful analysis of the statutory scheme that 1978 PA 427 was designed to amend and of prior Supreme Court interpretations of that scheme, I would conclude that 1978 PA 427 is an inte *310 gral part of an act clearly making an appropriation to a state institution and is not subject to referendum.
First, it is axiomatic that amendments are to be viewed, with the original act, as constituting a system of coherent legislation. Fowler v Board of Registration in Chiropody, 374 Mich 254, 257 ; 132 NW2d 82 (1965). Boards of County Road Comm’rs v Board of State Canvassers, 50 Mich App 89, 100 ; 213 NW2d 298 (1973), aff'd, 391 Mich 666 ; 218 NW2d 144 (1974). Secondly, the doctrine of in pari materia is implicitly a development of the judicial belief that legislators do not legislate in a vacuum; rather where separate laws involve the same subject matter and purpose, they should be viewed as part of one system to carry out the legislative purpose. Wayne County v Auditor General, 250 Mich 227, 232-233 ; 229 NW 911 (1930). Applying these established principles, the conclusion is inescapable that 1978 PA 427 is part of a comprehensive system appropriating monies for highway purposes, established in 1949 and interpreted, as amended, in 1951 in Michigan Good Roads Federation v State Board of Canvassers, 333 Mich 352 ; 53 NW2d 481 (1952).
1949 PA 300 , which 1978 PA 427 amends, established, inter alia, a schedule of weight taxes (§ 801), collected and deposited these taxes in the state treasury to the credit of the state highway fund and appropriated them for various highway purposes (§ 805). 1949 PA 300 , § 810, also deposited various other fees to the credit of the highway fund.
In 1951, 1949 PA 300 was amended in several respects. 1951 PA 51 repealed § 805 and replaced it with PA 51, § 10. Section 10 of this act established the Motor Vehicle Highway Fund (MVHF) and appropriated money credited to the MVHF and received from, among other sources, weight taxes on motor vehicles. 1951 PA 55 also amended 1949 PA 300 , § 810, to collect and deposit weight taxes and other fees collected under PA 300 to the credit of the MVHF. 1951 PA 55 contained tie-bar language to 1951 PA 51 .
In Michigan Good Roads Federation v State Board of Canvassers, supra, at 360-361, the Supreme Court construed 1951 PA 51 - 1951 PA 55 as a comprehensive system to collect registration and gas taxes and to use them for highway purposes. In that case, the Court read PA 51 and *311 PA 54 (the appropriation of gas taxes) in pari materia to conclude that they could not be treated separately since PA 54 necessarily points to PA 51 as the act distributing the monies appropriated under 1951 PA 54 .
This same analysis applies with even greater validity in regard to 1951 PA 55 . PA 55 merely credits money to a particular fund. It does not establish the fund nor explain how the money is to be spent. PA 51, to which PA 55 was tie-barred, establishes the Motor Vehicle Highway Fund and appropriates the money collected under 1951 PA 55 .
To paraphrase the language in Good Roads, therefore, 1951 PA 55 , provides that it shall not take effect unless PA 51 is enacted. The funds collected in PA 55 and credited to the MVHF could not be appropriated and allocated withr out PA 51. "Without construing them [51 and 55] together, * * * [these acts] would be unworkable.” Good Roads, supra, at 360 .
The position of 1978 PA 427 in the appropriations and funding framework established by 1949 PA 300 , as amended by 1951 PA 55 and as modified by 1951 PA 51 , is evident. As of September 30,1978, the legislation imposing and appropriating weight taxes consisted of 1978 PA 427 , amending 1949 PA 300 , 1951 PA 55 , also an amendment to the 1949 act and, as per the Good Roads case, 1951 PA 51 . On October 10, 1978, 1951 PA 51 was amended by 1978 PA 444 , which indisputably makes an appropriation to a state institution. Based on the foregoing legislative history and established precedent, I would conclude that 1978 PA 427 forms part of a standing appropriation to a state institution whose details are laid out in 1978 PA 444 .
Unquestionably, the right of referendum would apply to 1978 PA 426 and 427 unless these acts could be fairly and reasonably construed to constitute appropriations to a state institution. Our Supreme Court has clearly indicated in Good Roads that the statutory scheme which the acts before us amend, qualifies them for an exemption from referendum. The absence of tie-bar language between the 1978 acts thus becomes immaterial and makes the existence of a statutory appropriations scheme no less clear. I am persuaded, therefore, that that case requires us to view these acts also as integral parts of an overall legislative scheme and to afford them a similar exemption.