holding that a prosecutor's statement to the jury that his own witness was not going to tell the truth satisfied the reason for the rule on admonition with respect to accomplice testimony
How later courts described this case
- holding that a prosecutor's statement to the jury that his own witness was not going to tell the truth satisfied the reason for the rule on admonition with respect to accomplice testimony
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disapproved on other grounds by People v. Ward, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 464 (2005)
10 Cal.3d 460, 473 , disapproved on another ground by People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 212
The opinion
CLARK, J.
While I concur in affirming the judgment, I cannot agree the trial court was compelled to instruct the jury on accomplice testimony. (See ante, p. 466, fn. 3.)
Section 1111 of the Penal Code defines an accomplice as “one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant *475 on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.” When she testified at defendant’s second trial, Carolyn Thorin could not have been his accomplice within the meaning of section 1111 because, having been acquitted of the charge at the first trial, she was no longer hable to prosecution for the murder charged against defendant. This interpretation of the statute is consistent with the rationale of the rule requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony—“the fear that an accomplice may be motivated to falsify his testimony in the hope of securing leniency for himself.” (People v. Bowley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 855, 857 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 471 , 382 P.2d 591 , 96 A.L.R.2d 1178 ].) Since Carolyn Thorin was no longer subject to prosecution, she was no longer in need of leniency.
People v. Wallin (1948) 32 Cal.2d 803 [ 197 P.2d 734 ] is distinguishable. The accomplice in Wallin had been convicted in the earlier proceeding and therefore was possibly motivated to testify falsely in hope of gaining favorable post-conviction treatment.
The possibility Carolyn Thorin testified falsely against defendant to avoid disgrace or prosecution for perjury probably furnished a ground for impeachment 1 but failed to give rise to a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury her testimony required corroboration.
Section 780, subdivision (f), of the Evidence Code provides: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, the court or jury may consider in determining the credibility of a witness any matter that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing, including but not limited to . . . [t]he existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive.”
CALJIC No. 2.20, which catalogues the matters affecting credibility set forth in sections 780 and 788 of the Evidence Code, was given on the court’s own motion.