noting the State may exercise its police power to “ ‘prescribe laws tending to promote the health, peace, morals, education, good order and welfare of the people’ ” (quoting Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 153, 53 P.2d 615 (1936))
How later courts described this case
- noting the State may exercise its police power to “ ‘prescribe laws tending to promote the health, peace, morals, education, good order and welfare of the people’ ” (quoting Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 153, 53 P.2d 615 (1936))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Finley, C. J.
(concurring) — I have signed and concur fully in the majority opinion. However, because of the very apparent disparity in the majority’s and the dissent’s description of the legal issues involved in this case, I feel it is *431 necessary and appropriate to make this short supplemental statement.
The dissent mounts a spirited, and somewhat caustic and stinging verbal attack on something. However, this leaves me a bit uncertain as to the reasons for the sortie and even more dubious as to its objective, i.e., whether the legislature, the statute, or the majority opinion, is the target of the assault. In any event, I can say, or will concede that, it does seem to me the dissent is basically concerned about the legislative judgments made in the course of enactment of the statute involved in this appeal, said judgments having been made by one branch of our tripartite-structured state government, traditionally regarded as a constitutionally separate, independent and equal branch of state government.
It is my conviction that the legislative judgments made in the enactment of the statute are within the constitutional prerogatives of the legislative branch. Furthermore, I believe this is amply demonstrated or documented by the majority opinion. Finally, I feel some compulsion to say that it seems to me the legislative judgments consummated in the enactment of the statute merit, or even require, the exercise of judicial self-restraint of a very high order, rather than judicial remonstrance.
In other words, in terms of our appellate judicial function, let us render unto the legislators what is theirs, rightfully and constitutionally, in the matter of legislative judgments respecting the exercise of state police power under our state constitution. As Holmes, J., in a slightly different context, once remarked: “I think the proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express prohibition in the Constitution of the United States or of the State, and that Courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of public policy that the particular Court may happen to entertain.” Tyson & Brother —United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).