recognizing a broader standing right to contest an illegal search than may be required by federal standards
How later courts described this case
- recognizing a broader standing right to contest an illegal search than may be required by federal standards
- “It is within the power of this court to apply higher constitutional standards than are required of the States by the Federal Constitution.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the majority opinion; however, because of the nature of the dissent, I am compelled to respond thereto.
The dissent seems to be based upon an issue not raised by the parties and involves facts not in dispute. It is an obvious attempt to avoid a determination of the Fourth Amendment issue.
Notwithstanding the dissent’s contention that the appeals must be dismissed because Matthews and Long failed to provide this court with the records upon which it may review the trial court’s determination of the Fourth Amendment issue, the dissent proceeds to quote from the dissenting opinions of past and present justices of the United States Supreme Court who *105 have disapproved the exclusionary rule made applicable to the State by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 , 84 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961).
This is a unique approach and no doubt is encouraged by the dissent’s belief that because of the change in the composition of the United States Supreme Court in recent years that court is about to reverse itself if and when a proper vehicle presents itself. If it is so that the Supreme Court is just waiting for the appropriate opportunity, it is surprising that it did not utilize United States v. Robinson, 218 U.S. 414 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), reversing, 153 U.S.App.D.C, 114, 471 F.2d 1082 (1972), cert. granted, 410 U.S. 982 , 93 S.Ct. 1500 , 36 L.Ed.2d 177 (1973), a case decided by it on December 11 of last year, which involved the scope of a search incidental to an arrest.
Justices of the United States Supreme Court have certain privileges that justices of the appellate courts of the States do not have. One of those privileges and, indeed, obligations is to dissent from the majority opinion when it is believed that the majority opinion is in error. As justices of a State appellate court, however, we must adhere to the decisions of the majority of the United States Supreme Court on questions affecting the United States Constitution and citizens’ rights thereunder. For that reason we cannot resort to dissenting opinions of justices of the United States Supreme Court as a basis for our opinion when majority opinions of the United States Supreme Court are to the contrary. The exclusionary rule was made applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, supra, and until it is reversed by a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States, we are obligated to apply it. In the instant case we are talking about Fourth Amendment rights. Our obligation to apply constitutional law as the majority of the United States Supreme Court has stated it applies to all United States constitutional issues.
PAULSON, J., concurs.