recognizing the ancillary benefits of the preliminary hearing
How later courts described this case
- recognizing the ancillary benefits of the preliminary hearing
- explaining history of preliminary examinations
- “we see no principled basis for attempting to maintain a distinction between the arrest warrant probable cause standard and the preliminary hearing probable cause standard. . . . This ‘reasonable belief’ standard has the advantage of being more easily understood while still allowing magistrates to fulfill the primary purpose of the preliminary hearing, ‘ferreting out. . . groundless and improvident prosecutions’ ”
- "[The probable cause showing at the preliminary examination must establish a prima facie case against the defendant from which the trier of fact could conclude the defendant was guilty of the offense as charged."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by State v. Clark, 414 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (2001)
State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added), overruled by State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 16, 20 P.3d 300.
The opinion
CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(concurring in result, with comments):
I concur in the result of the main opinion, but feel impelled to make some observations.
According to my understanding of the opinion, its import is that if Section 77-15-19, U.C.A. is applied in accordance with its terms, by admitting evidence by hearsay or by affidavit, it is in violation of constitutional safeguards. With this I cannot agree. The statute impresses me as being carefully and advisedly drawn, with adequate protections for the rights of an accused, and of the public; and that it is therefore fair and constitutional if properly applied.
It is also pertinent to observe that the courts should not reach out and hold a statute unconstitutional in the abstract, but should do so only if it is in violation of the constitutional rights of the person complaining. 1 The main opinion itself properly points out that what was done in applying Section 77-15-19 in this case resulted in no prejudice to the defendants. I am therefore unable to see justification or purpose in attacking either that statute or its application herein. 2
I agree that the grant of immunity by the county attorney to defendant Bracken-bury is fairly understood to include what *788 was done with respect to the prospective witness Applegate; and that the charge against him should be dismissed.
. Baird v. State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713 (1978).
. That when the court determines that a statute does not apply in a case, it should not go further and consider its validity, see 3 Am.Jur. 383; Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368 , 374 P.2d 839 (1962); State v. Granato, Utah, 610 P.2d 1290 (1980).