concluding that, absent evidence of a “history of similar incidents” or notice, or evidence that the governmental entity’s “failure to take meliorative action was deliberate,” plaintiff’s claim of municipal liability under § 1983 fails
How later courts described this case
- concluding that, absent evidence of a “history of similar incidents” or notice, or evidence that the governmental entity’s “failure to take meliorative action was deliberate,” plaintiff’s claim of municipal liability under § 1983 fails
- holding that an officer seized the plaintiff when he momentarily grabbed her hand to retrieve a paper she was holding
- concluding, in a § 1983 case, that the plaintiffs “liberty was restrained when Deputy Carson grabbed her right hand as she certainly was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about her business”
- explaining that although the Court should evaluate the decision to use force “from the perspective of an objective officer,” the facts must still be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RYAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result, but write separately because, as the District Court Judge Patrick Duggan correctly concluded, Ms. Slusher was not “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The test is whether, taking into account all the circumstances in which Ms. Slusher was involved, a reasonable person would have felt free to leave the scene throughout the encounter with the officers. See Brendlin v. California, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2402 , 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). It seems clear to me that a reasonable person would have known he or she was free to walk away from the officers; not with the warrant papers, to be sure-but walk away, nevertheless. Ms. Slusher has never claimed that the search warrant papers were her property and there is not the slightest indication in the record that Ms. Slusher thought she was inhibited from leaving. The record is clear that the deputies did not want the warrant papers to be taken away from the area, and that they intended to retrieve them. Any brief restriction on Ms. Slusher’s personal movement was incidental to her refusal to return the documents to the officers, and not to any purpose on the part of the officers to prevent Ms. Slusher from leaving.
As the Supreme Court has reminded us, “not every governmental interference with an individual’s freedom of movement raises such constitutional concerns that there is a seizure of the person.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). Simply because police officers makes physical contact with or incidentally restrain an individual, does that mean he or she is seized as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. See Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 681 (6th Cir.2008).
The cases cited by the majority to support the conclusion that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred all involve an officer’s suspicion of criminality and some intent to investigate, restrain, or arrest the person claiming the illegal seizure. There are no such circumstances in this case. Here, the deputies gave no indication that they intended to limit Ms. Slusher’s liberty to walk away; they wanted the papers, not Ms. Slusher. Unlike the cases cited by the majority, the officers in this case were not suspicious that Ms. Slusher was involved in any criminal activity and they were not investigating her.
I believe the district court properly looked to the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for deciding whether Ms. Slush-er’s constitutional rights were violated, and correctly decided they were not.
*459 That said, I concur in the result my colleagues reach, and in the judgment.