The opinion
CALABRIA, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse and remand the trial court’s order granting a modification of defendant’s child support obligation for his minor children. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by deviating from the child support guidelines based on contributions the children received from a third party.
The majority essentially holds that it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to base a deviation from the child support guidelines on third party contributions unless there is a finding that the supporting parent is completely unable to provide support. This holding is overly restrictive and eviscerates the trial court’s discretion to consider third party payments when modifying child support payments.
Based on the presumptive guidelines, child support payments “shall be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4 (c) (2005). A trial court may vary from the guidelines if “the application of the guidelines would not meet or would exceed the reasonable needs of the child considering the relative ability of each parent to provide support or would be otherwise unjust or inappropriate." Id. (emphasis added). “Atrial court’s deviation from the [guidelines is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” State ex rel. Fisher v. Lukinoff, 131 N.C. App. 642, 644 , 507 S.E.2d 591, 593 (1998). A trial court has committed an abuse of discretion when its ruling is “manifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Ugochukwu v. Ugochukwu, 176 N.C. App. 741, 747 , 627 S.E.2d 625, 628-29 (2006).
The majority relies upon Gaston Cty. ex rel. Miller v. Miller, 168 N.C. App. 577 , 608 S.E.2d 101 (2005), to support its conclusion. However, Miller actually holds that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in considering payments from a third party in determination of child support. In Miller , this Court upheld the trial court’s decision to deviate from the guidelines when it considered how the trial court treated the adoption assistance payments. The majority’s statement that the trial court failed to credit the adoption assistance payments against the defendant-father’s support obligation is misleading. The defendant-father requested a one hundred percent credit. The trial court, in its discretion, reduced the defendant- *128 father’s obligation by only twenty percent of the children’s income. Id. The trial court found:
[Although the children are considered special needs children for the purpose of receiving adoption assistance income, the children do not have any additional or extraordinary expenses relating to any physical or emotional health needs, educational needs, or other special needs that should be considered by the court.
Id. at 580 , 608 S.E.2d at 103 . The trial court also made findings as to the parties’ employment circumstances and sources of income. However, there was no finding made that the defendant was unable to provide support for the children. The trial court determined that the presumptive amount would exceed the reasonable needs of the children and that a deviation from the guidelines was appropriate. Id. at 578 , 608 S.E.2d at 102 . Despite the fact that the trial court did not find that the defendant was unable to support the children, the Miller court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by deviating from the guidelines based on the payments to the children.
The Miller court relied on Guilford County ex rel. Easter v. Easter, 344 N.C. 166 , 473 S.E.2d 6 (1996), where our Supreme Court held that contributions from third parties may be used to determine whether deviations from the guidelines are appropriate. The Easter Court stated, “We find nothing in North Carolina case law or in N.C.G.S. § 50-13.4(c) which suggests that the contributions of third parties may not be considered when determining whether to deviate from the guidelines.” Id. at 169, 473 S.E.2d at 8 . In reaching its decision, the Easter Court reiterated that “[t]he role of the trial court is to determine whether the reasonable needs of the children are being met and whether imposing the presumptive amount would not meet or would exceed the reasonable needs of the children or would be otherwise inappropriate or unjust.” Id. The Easter Court further stated:
We emphasize that we are holding that the trial court may consider support by third parties when determining whether there is evidence to support a deviation. It is important to note that contributions from a third party will not always support deviation from the guidelines. In each case where the trial court considers whether the contributions of a third party support deviation from the guidelines, that court must examine the extent and nature of the contributions in order to determine whether a deviation from *129 the guidelines is appropriate considering the criteria for deviation set out in N.C.G.S. § 50-13.4(c).
Id. at 171, 473 S.E.2d at 9 .
The majority also relies upon Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617 , 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991), to support its holding. However, Browne is distinguishable from the case sub judice. In Browne , the father appealed an initial child support order arguing that the trial court did not give due consideration to the estates of each child. The children in Browne each owned separate $300,000.00 estates consisting of real and personal property. The Browne Court affirmed the trial court’s decision not to reduce the father’s child support obligation merely because the children owned separate estates. The Browne court placed great emphasis on the father’s income from his employment, annual income distributions from a trust fund and payments previously received from the children’s estates as reimbursement for expenditures on behalf of the children. In the case sub judice, defendant’s motion to modify child support payments was not based on separate estates owned by the children but based on monthly payments made on behalf of the children for their support. Further, the defendant in the present case only has one 'source of income and is obligated to support his four non-custodial children as well as his newborn child. In addition, he provides health insurance for all five of them.
Finally, the majority misapplies Gowing v. Gowing, 111 N.C. App. 613 , 432 S.E.2d 911 (1993), to the case sub judice. In Gowing , this Court vacated the trial court’s initial child support determination because the trial court denied the plaintiff’s request for child support without making findings regarding the reasonable needs of the child, the earning capacity or incomes of the parties, the relative ability for each parent to pay support, and the child care and homemaker contributions. In Gowing , the trial court conclusively determined there was no need for child support because the child received monthly payments from a structured settlement. The Gowing Court remanded the order because the trial court did not make adequate findings. The Court stated, “If the trial court varied from the guidelines because their application would exceed the reasonable needs of the child considering the relative ability of each parent to provide support, then the court must make findings as to the abilities of each parent to provide support and the reasonable needs of the child.” Id., 111 N.C. App. at 617 , 432 S.E.2d at 913 . Unlike the trial court in Gowing , the trial court in the case sub judice took into consideration eleven factors to *130 support both the basis for its decision and the basis for the amount of the modified child support payment. Here, the trial court’s findings regarding the reasonable needs of the children, the income and earning capacities of the parties, and the defendant’s other support obligations were sufficient to support its decision to deviate from the guidelines.
The majority opinion creates an artificial limitation to the trial court’s discretion and is contrary to the rule set forth by our Supreme court in Easter and followed by this Court in Miller, Browne and Gowing. Specifically, the majority holds that a deviation from the child support guidelines based on third party contributions is an abuse of discretion unless there is a finding that the supporting parent is completely unable to provide support when other findings supporting the deviation have been made.
Based on our statutes and case law, the trial court has discretion to determine whether deviation from the guidelines is appropriate when there is a substantial change in the needs of the minor children by making findings regarding the reasonable needs of the children as well as the contributions from the parents and their ability to provide support. The trial court made sufficient, findings of fact and its decision is manifestly supported by reason. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it considered the social security payments in ordering a modification of defendant’s liability for child support.