holding that the admission of immigration status, "even if marginally relevant [regarding damages], was highly prejudicial"
How later courts described this case
- holding that the admission of immigration status, "even if marginally relevant [regarding damages], was highly prejudicial"
- holding that state could be sued when highway patrol officer allowed a motorcyclist who had struck a pedestrian to leave the scene without obtaining his identity
- noting it is well established that res judicata applies to workmen’s compensation determinations, as does collateral estoppel, where party against whom it is asserted was party to prior adjudication
- holding illegal immigrant status, “even if marginally relevant [on damages issues], was highly prejudicial”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Strong v. State, 201 Cal. App. 4th 1439 (2011)
) Clemente II upon which the trial court relied to conclude otherwise is inapposite, in that the applicability of section 821.6 was not an issue in Clemente II.
The opinion
KAUS, J. *
I concur in the result and in all parts of the court’s opinion, except—if I read it correctly—its view of the impact of Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 233 , 664 P.2d 137 ], on the law of the case as laid down in Clemente I. The court makes a valiant effort to reconcile the two decisions but, with all respect, it does not quite work. Of course Williams does not preclude liability where the officer’s conduct prevents other assistance, but there is no evidence here that this was the case. At most, the situation was such that had trial counsel known that such proof was essential, he might have been able to produce it. The real—and only—point is that Clemente I did not require such proof and Williams was not decided until after the trial of this case. Under such circumstances, refusal to apply the doctrine of the law of the case would be most unfair. Just as that doctrine will not be adhered to “where its application will result in an unjust decision” (DiGenova v. State Board of Education (1962) 57 Cal.2d 167, 179 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 367 P.2d 865 ]), it should not be laid aside where to do so would be manifestly wrong.
Grodin, J., concurred.
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.