stating that when “parental rights have been terminated by a final order, as the result of . . . a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, [that person] does not have standing . . . to move for a modification of disposition[.]”
How later courts described this case
- stating that when “parental rights have been terminated by a final order, as the result of . . . a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, [that person] does not have standing . . . to move for a modification of disposition[.]”
- explaining that the plain language of the modification statute permits a proper party “to move for a modification of the child’s disposition where a change of circumstances warrants such a modification”
- stating that incarceration alone, which removed 7 parent’s ability to care for child, was a “[m]ere ‘duress of circumstance’” that did not constitute duress to set aside voluntary relinquishment.
- stating that incarceration alone, which removed parent’s ability to care for child, was a “[m]ere ‘duress of circumstance’” that did not constitute duress to set aside voluntary relinquishment.
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BENJAMIN, Justice,
concurring.
This case is not about the mother. It is about Cesar L. It is about his welfare. The mother had counsel. The mother voluntarily relinquished her maternal rights. There was no fraud. There was no duress. This voluntary relinquishment was notarized. Cesar L. is entitled to permanency and stability. Judge Silver ruled correctly and in the best interests of this child. I concur in this affirmation.