holding that, under the Alaska Constitution, the authority of the police to conduct investigative stops based on less than probable cause is limited to situations where the officers have reasonable suspicion of an imminent public danger or of recent serious harm to persons or property
How later courts described this case
- holding that, under the Alaska Constitution, the authority of the police to conduct investigative stops based on less than probable cause is limited to situations where the officers have reasonable suspicion of an imminent public danger or of recent serious harm to persons or property
- holding that investigatory stops are constitutionally permissible in circumstances where a police officer "has a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists or serious harm to persons or property has recently occurred. ..."
- holding that an officer may conduct an investigative stop only if the officer has “reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists or serious harm to persons or property has recently occurred”
- allowing a warrantless investigatory stop in cases "where the police officer has reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists or serious harm to persons or property has recently occurred"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BOOCHEVER, Chief Justice,
with whom RABINOWITZ, Justice, joins, concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion in all respects except for the discussion of the prosecutor’s conduct in questioning Mr. Coleman before the grand jury about his silence after arrest. ■ An inference of guilt may not be drawn from a failure to speak or to explain when a person has been arrested, 1 and evidence of silence in the face of custodial interrogation by police is not properly admissible in a trial. 2 Similarly, a prosecutor should not intentionally elicit evidence before a grand jury of an accused’s silence at the time of his arrest.
A prosecuting attorney who has properly prepared his case for the grand jury will know whether the accused remained silént or offered exculpatory statements after arrest. If the district attorney knows of exculpatory statements made by an accused after arrest, it is his duty to bring this information before the grand jury. If he knows that the accused remained silent after arrest, the prosecutor should not seek to bring this out. If any member of the grand jury specifically raises this issue, the *54 prosecuting attorney should explain the constitutional right to remain silent in such circumstances.
I do not find that the prosecutor’s conduct amounted to reversible error in this case because it appears from the transcript that the grand jurors were subsequently made aware of the accused’s right to remain silent. I cannot agree with the majority, however, that the district attorney acted properly in questioning the police officer about Coleman’s response after arrest.
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 695-96 (1966); Ivey v. United States, 344 F.2d 770 (5th Cir.1965).
. Doyle v. Ohio,-U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 , 44 U.S.L.W. 4902 (June 17, 1976); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 , 95 S.Ct. 2133 , 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975); United States v. Impson, 531 F.2d 274 , 19 Cr.L.Rptr. 2172 (5th. Cir.1976); Fowls v. United States, 410 F.2d 48, 50-51 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Nolan, 416 F.2d 588, 594 (10th Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Mailings, 364 F.2d 173, 175 (2nd Cir. 1966). The practice of commenting to a trial jury upon an accused’s silence after arrest has been specifically disapproved by this court in Davis v. State, 501 P.2d 1026, 1031 (Alaska 1972).